



Research Study

Native Language Activism: Exploring Language Ideologies in Ukraine

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ABSTRACT. The study explores language ideologies focusing on the ideology of *mother tongue* or *native language activism* in Ukraine in the sociopolitical context of events that prompt attention to language questions. Data are drawn from online media texts that are explicitly devoted to or address language matters in Ukraine. These texts are studied as *ideological sites* (Philips, 2000; Silverstein, 1979), which construct the specific ideological tendencies of a community. The study relies on Kroskrity's (2000; 2004) notions of language ideologies as various conceptions of and beliefs about language(s) and language practices. These language ideologies are also about various constructions of an image, place, and role of language(s) in a community. All of these conceptions index certain belongings, boundaries, and specific interests of members of a community. The results of analyses of both verbal and visual data allow us to discuss the positionality of online communities in producing and shaping specific beliefs and feelings with respect to languages in Ukraine, both Ukrainian and Russian. The native language ideology, prominent in the online media studied, is multifaceted and complex, and is explored within the established categories of *language image*, *language facelift*, and *language drive*. This study demonstrates that the ideology of native language activism is visible in various forms and through multiple expressions in online media, with the key idea that Ukrainian is the native language of all Ukrainians and is a unifying mechanism of the Ukrainian nation, state, and people.

RÉSUMÉ. La présente étude explore l'idéologie de langue maternelle et de l'activisme dans le contexte sociopolitique de l'Ukraine ainsi que les événements qui ont attiré l'attention sur les questions linguistiques. Les données sont tirées de textes médiatiques en ligne qui se consacrent explicitement aux questions linguistiques en Ukraine. Ces textes sont analysés en tant que "sites idéologiques" (Philips, 2000 ; Silverstein, 1979) qui construisent les tendances idéologiques spécifiques d'une communauté. L'étude s'appuie sur les notions d'idéologies linguistiques de Kroskrity (2000, 2004) comme diverses conceptions et croyances concernant la ou les langues ainsi que les pratiques linguistiques. Ces idéologies linguistiques concernent aussi diverses constructions de l'image, de la place et du rôle de la langue ou des langues dans une communauté. Ces conceptions répertorient certaines appartenances, certaines limites et certains intérêts spécifiques des membres d'une communauté. Les résultats des analyses à la fois verbales et visuelles éclairent la compréhension de la position des communautés en ligne dans la production et le façonnement de croyances et de sentiments spécifiques, dans le respect des langues en Ukraine, soit l'ukrainien et le russe. L'idéologie de langue maternelle, plutôt



proéminente dans les médias étudiés, est pluridimensionnelle et complexe. Elle est explorée dans le cadre des catégories bien établies : “image”, “facelift” et “drive”. Cette étude démontre que l’idéologie du militantisme pour la langue maternelle se manifeste sous différentes formes et à travers de multiples expressions sur les médias en ligne avec l’idée que l’ukrainien est la langue maternelle de tous les Ukrainiens et qu’il constitue un mécanisme d’unification de la nation, de l’État et du peuple.

Keywords: *language ideologies, language activism, native language, Ukrainian.*

NATIVE LANGUAGE ACTIVISM: EXPLORING LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES IN UKRAINE

This study investigates the manifestations of language ideologies in discourse surrounding the status and role of the Ukrainian language in present-day Ukraine.ⁱ It focuses on a particular language ideology of *native language activism*, and the prevalence of that ideology in online media. This article reflects results obtained from a larger study of how language and language matters are constructed in media and how specific media texts represent *ideological sites* (Philips, 2000; Silverstein, 1979) that drive and portray social, linguistic, and ideological tendencies in Ukraine (Nedashkivska, 2020). The larger project emphasized the multiplicity of competing or coexisting language ideologies constructed and enacted in contemporary Ukrainian media. The four main language ideological tendencies that were identified and discussed in the larger project were: the ideology of *language as a national and state symbol*; the ideology of *mother tongue* or *native language activism*; the ideology of *democratic linguistic bilingualism*; and the ideology of *plurilingualism and internal diversity*.ⁱⁱ The project demonstrated that the ideology of *mother tongue* or native language activism was by far the most prominent in the texts under discussion, and that this phenomenon deserved further investigation, thus inspiring this article. A brief overview of the linguistic situation in Ukraine post-independence situates this discussion in the sociopolitical context within which the texts under study have been produced and constructed.

Language situation and the sociopolitical context since Ukraine’s independence

Even three decades after achieving independence in 1991, Ukraine continues to experience tensions, debates, and conflicts over language, especially concerning the status and roles of its two main languages, Ukrainian and Russian, though minority languages also sometimes enter the debate. These events are summarized in Table 1 below.



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Year	Political event	Language planning event
1991-Aug-24	Ukraine declares independence from the USSR	<i>Note:</i> Ukrainian is the sole state language of Ukraine since 1989
2004	Orange Revolution (pre and post time period)	Proposals on granting Russian the status of second state language circulate
2005-Jan– 2010-Feb	Under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko	Promotion of Ukrainian as the sole state language
2010-Feb– 2014-Feb	Under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich	Leading an ambivalent language politics: discussions around Russian as the second state language in Ukraine, especially through manipulations of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and narratives about how Ukrainian is to be developed as the sole state language of Ukraine
2012	Under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich	The Kivalov-Kolesnichenko language bill “On the Principles of the State Language Policy” passes; downgrading of the official status of Ukrainian
2013–2014	Maidan Revolution / Revolution of Dignity	Attention to the language question is heightened in public debates, media, and social media
2014-Feb	Overthrowing of Yanukovich’s government	New government attempts to revoke the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko bill; the move is blocked by parliament; the language question re-enters public debate
2014-June– 2019-May	Under the presidency of Petro Poroshenko	The 2018 Bill 5670-D is introduced (developed into 2019 Language Law, described below)
2019-Apr-25	Under the presidency of Petro Poroshenko	“Law on Guaranteeing the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language” is



approved in Parliament (adopted on July 7, 2019)

2019-May →	Under the presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky (2019-)	The 2019 language law is reviewed amidst massive protests (July 2020)
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Table 1: Timeline of the major political and language planning events and upheavals since independence

Since 1989, Ukrainian has been the sole state language of Ukraine, but due to the long history of Russian imperial dominance, the Soviet Union's Russification policies, and post-Soviet Russia's continuing influence, Russian is still widely spoken and understood in Ukrainian society (Besters-Dilger, 2008; Bilaniuk, 2017a, 2017b; Kulyk, 2006, 2010, 2014b; Moser, 2013; Nedashkivska, 2010; Taranenko, 2007).

Since the early 2000s, discussions of language use have regained prominence, particularly proposals to grant Russian the status of Ukraine's second official language. This was particularly true prior to and during the national presidential campaign of 2004, followed by the Orange Revolution.ⁱⁱⁱ During the presidential campaign of 2004, Viktor Yanukovich, whose support base consisted mainly of southeastern Ukrainians, "advanced the idea of the Russian language as the second state language (official language),^{iv} using the slogan 'two languages, one nation'" (Taranenko, 2007, p. 132). In this same campaign, Viktor Yushchenko, president of Ukraine from January 2005 to February 2010, promoted Ukrainian as the sole official language. This linguistic conflict, already acute during the presidential elections, has continued to intensify since then, although language was not the main issue on the elections agenda.^v President Yushchenko was often criticized for insufficient attention to language issues during his presidency, such as his failure to put forward a new state language law that would avoid ambiguity, and his lack of regulations for print media.^{vi}

The Yanukovich presidency lasted from February 2010 to February 2014, with language politics oscillating between various configurations of status and function for both Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine (Nedashkivska, 2010, p. 353). In 2012, the Yanukovich administration passed a contentious bill on regional languages: the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko language bill titled *On the Principles of the State Language Policy*. This bill stated that in regions of Ukraine in which at least 10% of the population spoke a minority language, that minority language would be granted official regional status. In the east and south of Ukraine, this "minority" language was Russian, which thus received wide-ranging rights to be used in official documentation, education, the judiciary system, and the mass media. The bill also contributed to a significant downgrading of the official status of Ukrainian in nearly half of Ukraine's regions.^{vii} In Masenko's (2016) view, the bill constituted "an instrument of the Russian attack on the Ukrainian language," and yet



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"another legislative basis for the continued Russification and denationalization of Ukrainians in a formally independent state." Controversies, debates, and country-wide protests surrounding the bill contributed to an extremely complicated, and often not very clear, map of language politics leading to the Maidan Revolution.

The period of the Maidan Revolution, or the Revolution of Dignity of 2014^{viii} was marked by noteworthy transformations of Ukrainian society as it shifted from an ethnically and linguistically divided nation to a society that embraces diverse ethnic, civic, and individual backgrounds (Diuk, 2014; Kulyk, 2014a; Onuch, 2014; Osypian, 2014). In the context of political events during the Maidan Revolution, several issues that relate to the language situation surfaced. After the antidemocratic government was overthrown and the president Yanukovych fled his presidential post in February 2014, the new Ukrainian government attempted to revoke the Regional Languages Law of 2012. This move was blocked by parliament and never passed. However, the initiative itself to revoke the law was constructed by the Russian media as the new Ukrainian government's plan to outlaw the use of Russian in Ukraine. The language question received more attention in public debates and especially on social media.

The next set of events relating to the language debate began under the presidency of Petro Poroshenko with the 2018 Bill 5670-D, which became the 2019 *Law on Guaranteeing the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language*. This law, approved in Parliament on April 25, 2019 and adopted on July 7, 2019, requires the use of the Ukrainian language in most aspects of public life: Citizens are required to know the state language, and it must be used in all official dealings, excluding private communication and religious ceremonies. According to this law, 90% of television and film content is to be in Ukrainian. Ukrainian-language printed media and books are to make up at least 50% of the total publication output. Needless to say, the law met immediate opposition from the Kremlin for allegedly discriminating against Russian-speakers in Ukraine.^{ix} At the time of this writing, the debate is about to resurface. On July 7, 2020, the Parliament of Ukraine under President Zelens'kyi reviewed the 2019 law amidst massive protests (see Kiss, this issue, for an analysis of blog posts as reactions to the new language law and language activism with respect to language policies in Ukraine).

This study draws on texts that reflect sociopolitical questions about language in Ukraine. These texts have been produced and circulated in social media during peaks of language debates, such as the post-Maidan period, the war with Russia, and renewed debates in 2019–2020 over language. Specifically, these texts were classified in the larger study as belonging to the language ideology of native language activism. They form the core of this investigation and are studied and discussed below.



LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES

Language ideologies: Overview of concepts

The concept of language ideologies continues to enjoy much attention in scholarship, but “there is no single core literature, and there are a number of different emphases” (Woolard, 1998, p. 3) to delimiting the concept. In this study, I place an emphasis on the intersections of language and the social world, in that ideologies of language are not about language alone. Language matters are constructed around the experiences of social actors and are connected to personal and group beliefs, feelings, memberships, positionalities, belongings, and distancings. Within such positioning of language ideology, Kroskrity’s framework (2000), stemming largely from the linguistic-anthropological tradition, is most relevant. Therefore, I study language ideologies as “beliefs, feelings, and conceptions about language structure and use which often index the political economic interests of individual speakers, ethnic and other interest groups, and nation states” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 192). Explicitly voiced or embedded in the practices of a particular group, these beliefs, feelings, and conceptions represent various attempts at rationalizing and/or validating language practices in or of a particular community (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 192). According to Kroskrity, language ideologies encompass not only beliefs about language but also concepts that assist us in studying these beliefs (2000, p. 195).

The framework in which this discussion is situated “problematizes speakers’ consciousness of their language and discourse as well as their positionality...in shaping beliefs, proclamations, and evaluations of linguistic forms and discursive practices” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 192). Such a positionality is complex and tied to the sociopolitical and sociocultural experiences of a particular group. As Kroskrity has pointed out, language ideologies are inherently multidimensional: They represent the perceptions of language and discourse that are constructed in the interest of a particular group, often underlying attempts to use language with intentions to promote, protect or legitimate the group’s interests; they are tied to multiple social experiences of a group; they may be explicitly articulated by group members or embedded in actual practices; they mediate between the sociocultural experiences of social actors of a group and their linguistic and discursive resources; and they play important roles in identity construction (Kroskrity, 2000, pp. 195–200; Kroskrity, 2004, p. 501). This project also stresses that “language ideologies are constantly produced, reproduced, circulated in a variety of discursive arenas, including (but not restricted to) mediated public discourses” (Androutsopoulos, 2010, p. 184).

Language ideologies in Ukraine

The question of language ideologies in Ukraine has received scholarly attention, particularly after independence in 1991 and following the Maidan revolution. Bilaniuk (2015; 2017) defines two principal language ideologies in circulation, which she terms *language does not matter* (i.e., it does not matter which language you speak) and *language matters* (i.e., language choice



matters). The *language does not matter* ideology endorses language choice: people are free to choose the language they speak, and this choice is not important as long as they can understand each other (Bilaniuk, 2017). This ideological position, according to Bilaniuk (2017), can possibly neutralize the politicization of language choice, but at the same time could be problematic. In Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian are not treated as socially or politically equal, and not everyone is equally proficient in both (Bilaniuk, 2015, p. 4). In this context, Bilaniuk's *language matters* ideology relates to code-switching from Russian to Ukrainian. This ideology supports linguistic Ukrainianization, the main idea of which "is that Ukrainian language is essential in justifying Ukraine's sovereignty and reducing the threat from Russia" (2017, p. 5).

Kulyk (2018) also studies language ideologies in Ukraine, stressing the contrasting and conflicting ideologies in the presentation of the national self and the internal other, with language playing an important role in this conflict. Kulyk (2018) focuses on perceptions held by Ukraine's Russian-speakers and outlines the competing language ideologies within the ongoing conflict in Ukraine: The ideology of identification, which "prioritizes the role of language as a marker of group identity, first and foremost a national one" (2018, p. 76), and the ideology of understanding, which is "a widespread belief seeing language primarily not as a marker of group identity but as a conduit for conveying information" (Kulyk, 2018, p. 79).^x

In an earlier study of online media (Nedashkivska, 2020a), I delineated four prominent and visible language ideologies that are being constructed and enacted in the Ukrainian context, particularly after the Revolution of Dignity and at the time of the war. The ideology of language as a national and state symbol of Ukraine advocates Ukrainian as the only language that can assure Ukraine's sovereignty and political stability. The ideology of "democratic" bilingualism projects the idea of a bilingual Ukraine, which is presumably united, regardless of what language one speaks. This ideological trend projects a "harmonious" coexistence of Ukrainian and Russian, thus "mediating" between unity and bilingualism. The texts in this study, however, demonstrate that this ideological trend does not in reality project equitable relationships between the two languages. Russian dominates public discourse on the language question and in actual practice in online texts. The ideologies of plurilingualism and internal diversity showcase diverse dialects and regional language variants as well as minority languages. The fourth and most prominent language ideology, *mother tongue* (i.e., *native language activism*), creates an image of Ukrainian as a native language of all Ukrainians, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds, and stresses the role of Ukrainian as an important defence mechanism in today's climate of political instability and war (Nedashkivska, 2020a). As noted above, this last ideological trend is the focus of this article.

METHOD

The corpus from which I draw is extracted from a larger research project, as noted in the introduction section. In order to avoid repetition, I only briefly summarize the data collection and analysis procedures (see Nedashkivska, 2020a). The texts studied are taken from social



media communities that are explicitly devoted to or that specifically address language matters in Ukraine. These communities are primarily those that have been formed since 2012, when the controversial Regional Language Law was passed. Most of the texts analyzed in this study emerged after the Revolution of Dignity of 2013–2014. These texts are considered ideological sites (Philips, 2000; Silverstein, 1979) that construct, reconstruct, and portray social, linguistic, and ideological tendencies in a particular community, thus contributing to the production and enactment of language ideologies in this community. The texts were collected primarily in November 2016, with additional texts added to the corpus between 2017 and 2020.

Using the search and select mechanisms of the larger project and the narrowing down of the corpus based on the established criteria,^{xi} twenty-six online media communities were selected for this study. Texts that “express or signal the opinions, perspective, position, interests or other properties of groups” (van Dijk, 1995, p. 22) formed the core of the data set. I followed van Dijk’s (1995) definition of units of analysis: A unit that “expresses, establishes, confirms or emphasizes a self-interested group opinion, perspective or position, especially in a broader socio-political context of social struggle, is [considered] a candidate for...an ‘ideological’ analysis” (p. 23). This study focused on units that contain explicit reference to, and include arguments about, language(s) and language questions in Ukraine. They contained profile images, titles and slogans on the profile image and/or the main page, and main descriptions of projects that focus on language matters (the “about”, or “community” or “info” sections on a Facebook page or a site).^{xii} The units are comprised of both verbal and visual texts, which necessitated the incorporation of a multimodal approach, based on Kress and van Leeuwen’s seminal grammar of visual design (2001; 2006).

The selection yielded 109 units of analysis, all of which were similarly classified according to theme saliency into a total of 152 themes during the initial process. Subsequently, these themes were narrowed into four visible language ideologies. Ninety-six of these themes were classified as belonging to the ideology of mother tongue (i.e., native language activism), the most represented theme in the studied corpus. For the present focus, texts in the category of the native language activism were subjected to further study according to the sub-themes they displayed. This approach yielded a number of sub-groups which subsequently were narrowed down to three main topical threads that structure the analysis provided below:

- a) *Language image*: Texts that draw a particular portrait of Ukrainian;
- b) *Language facelift*: Texts that emphasize a need for changes in the language;
- c) *Language drive*: Texts, which promote Ukrainian for a wider communication and use in the society.

In this study, the analysis is qualitative and the aim is neither to demonstrate any prevalence nor to claim any quantitative authority. The goals are rather to focus on a close reading of the units under discussion as representative of the visible views, standpoints, positions, and



interests of a particular community that produces and reproduces, and is produced and reproduced by, specific texts that have certain ideological orientation(s).

FINDINGS

The ideology of mother-tongue or native language activism

The present section offers results of the analysis, interpreting the data through the lens of language ideologies framework outlined above. Here, the ideology of mother tongue or native language activism is viewed as a process or movement that constructs, promotes, and cultivates beliefs, feelings, and conceptions about the Ukrainian language as the native language of Ukrainians and as the national and state language of Ukraine, indexing Ukrainian as the country's native and national symbol. In Ukrainian, the term *native language* does not necessarily refer to one's first language: "Ukrainians tend to use the term to refer to the language with which they most closely identify" (Friedman, 2016, p. 168), and people's native language is the language that corresponds to their ethnic heritage, even if they are not proficient in that language.^{xiii}

The ideological sites that display native language activism produce a particular image of Ukrainian. First and foremost, these texts portray Ukrainian as the language of all Ukrainians, all of those who feel Ukrainian and love their native land. These online texts construct this native language as dynamic, timely, relevant, and modern. In the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity and at the time of the ongoing war with Russia, these texts also constructed an image of Ukrainian as distinct and distant from Russian, and thus as a defence mechanism, or even a defence weapon, against Putin's Russia. In this discourse, the Russian language is constructed as the language of the conqueror and aggressor.

The ideology of native language activism is widely visible in the conceptions of Ukrainian as in need of rejuvenation by ridding it of unnecessary borrowings and language-mixing, and by replenishing the corpus of contemporary language with a newly created and innovative lexicon. In addition, these texts explicitly articulate appeals to communicating in Ukrainian, pleas against indifference towards language choice, and numerous calls to Russian-speaking Ukrainians to switch to Ukrainian in their language practices. Overall, the texts emphasize the preservation, construction, and cultivation of Ukrainian as a worthy, elevated, precious, and, most importantly, well-rooted and strong native language of all Ukrainians, in Ukraine as a sovereign country and as a nation-state.

As noted above, the corpus of texts classified under the ideology of native language activism is rich in potential angles of study. Therefore, these multi-faceted expressions of language ideologies were divided into three main categories: language image, language facelift, and



language drive. These three categories are defined above, and discussed in more detail below with representative examples from the data set.

Language image

The texts studied construct a particular, multifaceted image of Ukrainian that contributes to the ideology of native language activism. This image characterizes Ukrainian as the language of the Ukrainian people, lively and vibrant, contemporary, timely and fun, as the language that enhances one's life, inspirational, empowering, melodious, and magical. These texts also present Ukrainian as clearly and justifiably distinct from Russian, especially during the war under the Putin administration. Ukrainian is constructed as a defence weapon or mechanism in the war, with the Russian language figuring in this discourse as the language of the aggressor.

The image of Ukrainian as an inherent language of the Ukrainian people, a language that is dynamic and lively, is constructed in texts from the Facebook community *Ukrains'ka mova – zhyva mova moho narodu* [Ukrainian Language–The Dynamic Language of My People] (2017), and this image is already evident in the community's name. The primary aim of this community is to popularize the Ukrainian language, history, culture, and traditions. The group's profile picture, for instance, clearly points to the ideological orientation of this community:



Figure 1: A multifaceted image of language as dynamic, lively, and with rich tradition
Note: "Svoiu UKRAINU liubit", T.H. Shevchenko ["Love your own UKRAINE", T.H. Shevchenko], from *Ukrains'ka mova – zhyva mova moho narodu* (2017, May 3).

The image in Figure 1 is colourful and visually active, with several elements suggesting the community's many rich facets and its *joie de vivre*. The traditional colourful wreath is a symbol of the Ukrainian culture and traditions. The waving ribbons on the wreath indicate the movement and dynamism of the community. Sunflowers, wheat fields, blooming gardens, forests, waters, flying birds and butterflies, and historical architecture are emblematic figures of Ukraine's proud heritage. In the centre of this image, Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko's well-known phrase



"Love your own Ukraine" recalls the glorious literary past and reminds the community about their love for the motherland and the necessity to preserve its many treasures.

The texts represent notable efforts to bring the Ukrainian language to the attention of the people, to create a positive and trendy image for Ukrainian, and to make Ukrainian visible in society. For instance, the online resource *Slovopys* [Wordwriter] (n.d.) uses slogans (translated here) such as "the Ukrainian language—it is contemporary and timely", and "Enrich yourself with Ukrainian!" to popularize Ukrainian. Both are powerful statements, suggesting that Ukrainian as the native language enriches one as a person regardless of one's first language. In this community, the theme of the Ukrainian language as a source of enhancement is present throughout postings and discussions, as seen in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Ukrainian, as a native language, enriches

Note: [pochatok vesny]Vidzymky Prykras' zhyttia UKRAINS'KOIU [[beginning of spring] Winterring-off Ornate your life with UKRAINIAN] (Slovopys, 2020, February 17)

In Figure 2, the lesser-known word *vidzymky* is presented as peculiar and exclusively Ukrainian, conveying the message that "truly" Ukrainian words can enhance people's lives as part of an "interesting" and "unique" language. In this example, as in several others in the data set, "Ukrainian" is spelled in all capital letters, symbolizing the elevation of the language's status. The promotion of the beauty and uniqueness of Ukrainian is also visible in another slogan (translated here) featured on the same site: "Reading is a pleasure! And reading in Ukrainian –



even more so!" (Slovopys, November 17, 2016). This slogan advocates the primacy of the native language above all other languages that could be one's first language.

These texts commonly construct an image of Ukrainian as distinct, and distant, from Russian. Several examples present Ukrainian words and phrases as the correct variants in comparison and contrast to the incorrect borrowings from Russian, as shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Ukrainian as distinct and distant from Russian (Ia spilkuisia ukrains'koiu movoiu, June 15, 2017) ([U] = Ukrainian; [R] = Russian)

[U] Mlyntsi smachnishi za [R] bliny.

I vzhali, pravyl'no ne blin, a triastsia!

("Mlyntsi=crepes [in Ukrainian] are tastier than bliny=crepes [in Russian].

And, by the way, not [R] blin =darn it, but [U] triastsia =darn it!")

Example 3 highlights the Ukrainian word *mlyntsi*, rather than the Russian word *bliny* [crepes]. In the singular, the Russian *blin* is also commonly used as an exclamation [darn it]. Here we find an equivalent to this exclamation, *triastsia*, which is presented as the "correct" Ukrainian form. Other similar examples can be found throughout this corpus of texts, presenting Ukrainian words as more suitable, more accurate, and better overall than their Russian equivalents.



Several texts juxtapose the Ukrainian term *mova* [language] with the Russian term *iazyk* [language], stressing that in Ukrainian, the word *iazyk* does not refer to “language”, but “tongue”, the body part. Moreover, references to the Russian language in addition to *rosiis'ka mova* [Russian language], also display variants such as *moskovyts'ka mova* or *mosvovyts'kyi iazyk* [Moscovite language], as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Juxtaposition of Ukrainian *mova* and Russian, Muscovite *iazyk* ‘language’ (Nasha Mova, June 4, 2020)

IA NE KHOCHU

V UKRAINI

Chuty moskovyts'kyi iazyk okupantiv azh do nashoi nad nymy peremohy!

(“I DO NOT WANT IN UKRAINE

to hear the Muscovite language of the captors until our victory over them!”)

In Figure 4, the term *moskovyts'kyi* is not capitalized, downplaying the worthiness of this language, and is also formed with an affix, *-yts'k-*, endowing this adjectival form accompanying [R] *iazyk* [language] with a harsh sound and a derogatory meaning. The Muscovite language overtly refers to the language of Moscow as an empire, aggressor, conqueror, and enemy relevant in the context of the war led by Putin, with obvious opposition between “us”, Ukrainians, and “them”, the Muscovite aggressors.



An image of Ukrainian as a defence mechanism or a defence weapon is also common, as seen in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Ukrainian as a defence mechanism (Ukrains'ka mova, May 30, 2019)

UKRAINS'KA MOVA
BRONEZHYLET DERZHAVY!

("UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE
A LIFE-VEST OF THE STATE")

In this image, the Ukrainian language is referred to as a life-vest of the Ukrainian state, its guard and savior. The visual analysis points to language as a crucial mechanism in protecting the state (e.g., the trident: the state symbol), the Ukrainian nation (e.g., the blue and yellow colours of the national flag), its peace (e.g., poppies), and its prosperity (e.g., wheat).

A notable image of Ukrainian as a powerful weapon in times of war can be seen in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Ukrainian as a weapon (Nasha Mova, December 20, 2019)

*Koly
ia hovoriu
UKRAINS'KOIU
z Kremlia tsehla padaie*

("When
I speak
UKRAINIAN
bricks are falling from the Kremlin")

The slogan in this example stresses the image and the power of the native Ukrainian language, reinforced by the capitalization of the word "Ukrainian." Similarly, the online community *Ia spilkuisia ukrains'koiu movoiu* [I Communicate in Ukrainian] (2014) uses the (translated) slogan "Language – is a treasure, weapon, and saviour. This is all that surrounds you" (*Ia spilkuisia ukrains'koiu movoiu*, 2019). As these and other instances demonstrate, the



construction of a particular and elevated image of Ukrainian as distinct from Russian and as a defence strategy contributes to the ideology of native language activism.

Language facelift

The category of language facelift includes the discourse of language restoration and rejuvenation, characterized by an opposition to unnecessary borrowings and language-mixing, as well as language creativity and crowdsourcing in order to replenish the Ukrainian language corpus. Language rejuvenation efforts are voiced, for instance, in texts of the *Chysta Mova* [Clean Language] project (2016). The title indicates the goal and intentions of this ideological site, “to contribute to ... richness and ... potential” of the Ukrainian language, as noted by the administrators. The language activism is evident from the information section about this online community. In it, the moderators stress the need for attention to one’s native language over an entire lifetime as exemplified in what they refer to as a well-known quotation from Voltaire: “One can master a foreign language in six years, but a native language needs to be studied over a lifetime.”

Language rejuvenation efforts are also visible in the rubric *Zabuta ukrains’ka* [Forgotten Ukrainian] (n.d.), which is produced by the translation centre Alesko in Kyiv. Numerous old Ukrainian words and phrases, many unknown to Ukrainian speakers today, have been resurrected by this community and highlighted in this space.

Efforts against unnecessary borrowings and language-mixing--Ukrainian--Russian language mixing in particular--contribute to the ideological tendency of language facelift. This type of language activism is visible in communities such as the aforementioned *Chysta Mova* [Clean Language] (2016) and *Ia spilkuisia ukrains’koju movoiu* [I communicate in Ukrainian] (2014), among others. In addition, the community *Mova Movoju* [Language by Language] (n.d.) focuses on activism against the mixed-language variant *Surzhyk* (most often, a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian),^{xiv} as indicated in its (translated) mission statement: “We love and cherish our Ukrainian. Anti-Surzhyk for everyday.” Activities of this community are directed towards transforming the language repertoire of Ukrainian speakers, as illustrated in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Language activism against language mixing (Mova Movoiu, 2019, January 26)

#antysurzhuk

X Bil'she roku navchaiusia

V Ponad rik navchaiusia

("#antiSurzhuk

X More than a year I study

V Above a year I study")

In this example, the first variant is presented as incorrect because it is a calque from Russian. The second variant is presented as the correct Ukrainian construction without linguistic mixing. The projects *Myslovo* [WeWord] (2013) and *Slovotvir* [Word Creator] (2014) are worthy of attention. These communities represent the responses of young Ukrainians to a lack of language planning initiatives in Ukraine. These crowdsourcing practices encourage users to send their recommendations about which items are to be included into the "new database" of Ukrainian. The creators of *Slovotvir* note:



We invited the Community to turn on their imagination and national-linguistic sensors and propose variants for the existing borrowings. Importantly, every one of you has an opportunity to vote for that variant, which appeals to you most... Our team believes that together as a community we will be able to find decent substitutes for foreignisms, thus making a small contribution to the development of the Ukrainian language (Slovotvir, 2016). ^{xv}

These practices are aimed at language rejuvenation, and the various calls for language creativity and crowdsourcing represent interactive platforms that contribute to the facelift of Ukrainian, as a national and a native language.

Language drive

The language drive tendency, identified as actively contributing to native language activism, is illustrated by the various appeals for communicating in Ukrainian: reasons and justification for speaking Ukrainian; appeals against indifference toward language choice because language unites all Ukrainians; calls for switching to Ukrainian; and initiatives towards teaching Russian-speaking Ukrainians the Ukrainian language. A number of texts illustrate various appeals toward communication in Ukrainian, which I view as language drive efforts. One of the particularly visible Facebook communities, *Ia spilkuisia ukrains'koju movoiu* [I Communicate in Ukrainian] (2014), demonstrates such a tendency. The moderators state that the main objective of this community is to protect and preserve the Ukrainian language. Only Ukrainian is allowed in communications on this ideological site, which indexes inclusions and exclusions based on the language participants use. The topic of language choice in Ukraine is a common theme in discussions. Participants of this community voice their stance about the use of Ukrainian in various contexts such as media, education, cultural events, and other public spaces, and in so doing display their native language activism. Another community, *Ukrains'ka mova dlia vsikh* [The Ukrainian Language for All] (2015) also calls upon its members to communicate in Ukrainian, stressing that "This is your language!" and directing their appeals to those whose first language is not Ukrainian.

The community *Chysta Mova* [Clean Language] (2016), also contributes to native language drive, as demonstrated in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Acting upon Ukrainian as the native language (Chysta Mova, June 17, 2020)

Tsinui	("Cherish
Chytai	Read
Tvory	Create
Kokhai	Love
Dumai	Think
Spivai	Sing
Slukhai	Listen
Plekai	Foster
Berezhy	Preserve
Rozvyvai	Develop
Zdobuvai	Achieve
Rozmovliai	Communicate
Ne zabuvai	Do not forget
Proslavliai	Glorify
RIDNU MOVU!	NATIVE LANGUAGE!")



Figure 8 illustrates the uniqueness of Ukrainian with the special Ukrainian letters on the right-hand side, displayed in yellow and blue, and visually foregrounds the native language displayed in all capital letters at the bottom of the image. This representation, following the grammar of visual design by Kress and van Leeuwen (2001; 2006), stresses the native language as the supposed real one. A long list of verbs on the left-hand side, in the imperative mood, prompts the reader to consider using the native language in a variety of contexts and for a variety of tasks. These include cherishing, cultivating, and glorifying Ukrainian as a native language.

Several texts present various justifications and reasons for communicating in Ukrainian. The following example from the community *Ia spilkuisia ukrains'koiu movoiu* [I Communicate in Ukrainian] (2014), summarizes the ideas promoted and shared in the online communities under examination.



Figure 9: Justification and reasons for communicating in Ukrainian (*Ia spilkuisia ukrains'koiu movoiu*, December 1, 2017)

Rozmovliaiu ukrains'koiu

Bo tse pryrodno, bo vona nache muzyka, bo neiu hovoryla mama, bo ia obyraiu sam, bo tse ne mova, a liubov, bo ia vchenyi kit, bo neiu pyshut' Zhadan i Kostenko, bo tse lehko i zruchno, shchob spodobatysia kytsi, bo tse kruto, tomu shcho naivazhlyvishe buty soboiu.



("I speak Ukrainian because it is natural; it is like music; my mother spoke it, because I choose it, because this is not a language but love, as I am an intelligent cat, because Zhadan and Kostenko write in it, because it is easy and convenient, in order for a female cat to like me, because it is cool, and most importantly, because one has to be oneself.")

The reasons for speaking Ukrainian presented in Figure 9 are plentiful and are all presented as legitimate. According to the image, the Ukrainian language is natural, easy, convenient and cool. It equals music and love, and is one's mother tongue, thus dear to one's heart. It is the language of high literature. Additionally, one chooses to speak Ukrainian because one is intelligent, wants to be liked by others, but importantly, one needs to remain its true self, the Ukrainian self.

A number of texts stress the idea of language matters (Bilaniuk, 2015; 2017). In texts classified under this theme, a common topic is that "our language unites us" or "our language unites the nation", as seen in Figure 10.



Figure 10: Language matters and language unites the nation (Nasha Mova, July 4, 2020)



MOVA
Maie znachennia

NASHA MOVA
IEDNAIE NATSIU
Mova Maie Znachennia

("LANGUAGE
matters
OUR LANGUAGE
UNITES THE NATION
Language matters")

The verbal message of Figure 10 explicitly presents the idea that *language matters*. The colours are exclusively yellow and blue, equally distributed in the image. The puzzle represents how language, "our" language, brings all the pieces of the puzzle into one united picture; how language is a "glue" to Ukraine's unity. This unity is also reinforced by the handshake at the bottom centre.

The message that language matters is also visible in various reminders that language choice is important in Ukraine. The messages of "our language" and "our language matters" are presented as timely, particularly in a time of war. This can be seen in Figure 11.



Figure 11: Native language matters and rejection of indifference (Nasha Mova, January 9, 2020)



NASHA MOVA MOVA
MAIE ZNACHENNIA

"KA-KA-IA RAZNITSTSA"
– TSE LYSHE PRO IAZYK

("[U] OUR LANGUAGE LANGUAGE
MATTERS
[R] "WHA-A-T'S THE DI-I-FFERENCE"
– [U] THIS IS ONLY ABOUT [R] LANGUAGE")

In Figure 11, "our language" and "language matters," placed at the top part of the image, are the "ideals" (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; 2006). The national colours and their floating dynamic suggest harmony and peace. The bottom part, which is the "real," depicts fire, representing the current war, accompanied by the Russian phrase for "What's the difference," criticizing the indifference towards language choice. The phrase is spelled in syllables, in order to emphasize the Muscovite pronunciation, and is presented in scare quotes, citing it as the other and distancing the site and its readers from this expression of indifference. The Russian phrase is followed by a (translated here) Ukrainian phrase, "his is only about tongue," juxtaposing the Ukrainian word *mova* with the Russian word *iazuk*, "language," or "tongue" in Ukrainian. The result is to associate *mova* with peace and *iazuk* with war. The critical representations of the indifference towards language choice through the Russian phrase *Kakaia raznitsia* ("What's the difference") are common in the texts under discussion. These texts, both verbally and visually, show that there is no place for such indifference in Ukraine.

The appeals for change in language practices further illustrate the language drive towards Ukrainian, especially by encouraging Russian-speaking Ukrainians to switch to Ukrainian in their everyday communication. The Facebook social initiative group *Perekhod' na ukrains'ku* [Switch to Ukrainian] (2015) presents various arguments for making the switch.^{xvi} Its profile image displays a roadway crosswalk painted in yellow and blue. The community's "about" section describes the project as one that brings "stories of people who switched to the Ukrainian language and since then communicate in it constantly." In this community, participants discuss language matters in Ukraine, the role and status of Ukrainian, and the peculiarities of the language. The site's promotion of the ideology of native language activism makes it a vivid and notable example of language drive.^{xvii}

Various online initiatives throughout Ukraine have organized courses for those wishing to learn Ukrainian. For instance, crowdsourcing initiatives to support the learning of Ukrainian free of charge have been popularized on a number of Facebook pages that promote learning Ukrainian in Ukraine (Velyka ideia, 2012). This volunteer movement has gathered over eighty volunteers and courses are being offered in over twenty cities in Ukraine. Over the past several years, approximately 2,000 people completed such courses, with the demand growing since the



beginning of the war. After completing the one-year Ukrainian language course, one graduate addressed her fellow Russian-speaking inhabitants in the city of Zaporizhzhia, in Ukrainian:

When I address you in our native language – answer me [in our native language], smile, support me. Let us create such a warm language environment in Zaporizhzhia, so that people from the entire country will visit us for this language warmth. (Velyka ideia, 2016, July 31)

This testimony and those of other graduates feature the common thread of Ukrainian as the native language of all Ukrainians regardless of their first language, something warm, dear, close to others' and one's own heart.

Another initiative is the portal *Ie Mova* [The language exists] (2015), which is geared specifically towards the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine: school children and adults from the occupied territories, including Crimea, as well as internally displaced persons, and even Ukrainians abroad. This project is an online platform that offers learning resources, language practice and testing, online e-lessons with instructors, and language certification.

Uchim ukrainskii iazyk [Let's Learn Ukrainian] (2015) is a Russian-language Facebook page that also offers free online lessons and tutorials for those wishing to learn Ukrainian. This platform is especially geared towards Russian-language speakers in Ukraine. Its avatar is the Ukrainian national flag, and the profile image displays a wheat field in yellow with a blue sky above, the national colours of Ukraine. Therefore, the page targets those who are not indifferent to the proclivity of the native language of Ukraine, and thus directly contributes to native language activism.

The Facebook site *Movna bezpeka* [Language Security] (2016) promotes activities meant to resist Russification in Ukraine in all social spheres. Although this particular group is not sizable, its goal and thematic discussions all point to the need for the protection of Ukrainian. This community promotes activities towards the native language drive, underlining the acuteness of the language situation in Ukraine today.

Calls for communicating in Ukrainian, arguments against indifference towards one's native language and/or language choice, appeals to switch to Ukrainian, and initiatives towards teaching Russian-speaking Ukrainians the Ukrainian language all illustrate the mother tongue or native language activism ideology. This ideological tendency supports the linguistic Ukrainianization of Ukraine, the key idea of which is that Ukrainian is the native language of all Ukrainians, although not everyone speaks it. Such activism communicates that the "Ukrainian language is essential in justifying Ukraine's sovereignty and reducing the threat from Russian" (Bilaniuk, 2015, p. 5).



DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the online texts reinforced our views of media as “exceptionally charged arenas” for battles over languages, as well as their use and value “because of their high prestige, their high visibility, and their inherent publicizing function” (Spitulnik, 1998, p. 181). The texts demonstrate the high charge of online media in the context of Ukraine and the media’s role in constantly producing, reproducing, and circulating particular language ideologies (see Androutsopoulos, 2010).

This study focused on language ideologies as conceptions, feelings, and beliefs about language use and language practices, language structure and language corpus, and language culture in a community, and how these conceptions are explicitly constructed and presented in online media or implanted in community practices (see Kroskrity, 2000). The texts under discussion provide insight into the positionality of specific online communities in shaping specific beliefs, feelings, and conceptions, which form language ideologies. This positionality is clearly linked to the community’s sociopolitical and sociocultural situations: the long and conflicted linguistic disputes in Ukraine, controversial or contested language laws and regulations, and the political unrest and war that has been ongoing since 2013.

This article is intended to elaborate on the ideology of the mother tongue, or native language activism. This ideology was the most visible in my exploration of the multiplicity of language ideologies in post-Maidan Ukraine (Nedashkivska, 2020a). The native language activism ideology, which echoes Bilaniuk’s (2015; 2017) concept of *language matters* and Kulyk’s (2018) notion of the *ideology of identification*, is multifaceted and complex, as the examination of these online texts demonstrates. This complexity can be presented within the three main categories of *language image*, *language facelift*, and *language drive*.

Online texts that construct a particular image of Ukrainian were common. In these texts, Ukrainian is presented as the language of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian people, and it is characterized as lively, vibrant, fun, unique, enhancing, inspirational, empowering, melodious, and magical. This language image is also strengthened by the construction of Ukrainian as distinct from the Russian language, especially that of Moscow. The emphasis on Moscow as other is further meant to distinguish Ukraine’s Russian speakers from Russian speakers outside of Ukraine. Indeed, Ukrainian is also depicted as a power tool, a life-vest, and a defence weapon against Russian aggression, with the Russian language often portrayed as that of the enemy, of the conqueror. The elevation of the image of Ukrainian as the language of Ukrainians, as their native language, is embedded in the construction of the opposition between Ukrainians as self and the Moscow-enemy as other, an example of ideologies being organized along an us–them axis (van Dijk, 1995, p. 22). This axis also points to the role of language in “naturalizing the boundaries of social groups” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 203), including boundaries around Ukraine with Ukrainian as the state and native language of all Ukrainians. The texts used in this study reveal the construction and enactment of a particular Ukrainian identity that underscore



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contrasts of Ukraine as a whole to Putin's Russia, thereby connecting the study of language ideologies to questions of national identity with language positioned "as a crucial means of achieving 'the imagined community' of national identity" (Anderson, 1991, in Kroskrity, 2000, p. 203).

Many of these texts portrayed Ukrainian as in need of restoration and rejuvenation. Some such projects sought to enhance the quality of the language by promoting "cleansing" it of unnecessary borrowings and language-mixing practices. When combined with practices of language creativity and crowdsourcing, efforts toward replenishment of Ukrainian can be seen as contributing to the projection of a necessary facelift for the language.

Several communities that appear in this study have voiced appeals for communication in Ukrainian in Ukraine. These ideological sites provide reasons and justifications for incorporating Ukrainian into language practices, thus legitimizing the use of Ukrainian in everyday communication. The texts also oppose indifference toward language choice. In this discourse, the idea that a language, the Ukrainian language, unites all Ukrainians is most prominent, particularly combined with the distinction between us (i.e., Ukraine and the Ukrainian language) and them (i.e., Russia—specifically Moscow—and the Moscovite language). Online communities that promote the cultivation of and drive toward Ukrainian as the mother tongue and national language also address Russian-speaking Ukrainians, emphasizing the importance of switching from Russian to Ukrainian in everyday conversation and offering educational initiatives for those who wish to learn and improve their Ukrainian. These language-drive communities are active in the language ideological arena.

The study demonstrates that language ideologies do not necessarily stem from official discourse of the ruling elites, but are "a more ubiquitous set of diverse beliefs, however implicit or explicit they may be, used by speakers of all types as models for constructing linguistic evaluations and engaging in communicative activity" (Kroskrity, 2004, p. 497). The multidimensional nature of language ideologies, as pointed out by Kroskrity (2000; 2004) was also observed and confirmed in these texts. The ideology of native language activism represents the construction of a language in the interest of a particular group, underlying attempts to use Ukrainian with the intention of promoting, protecting, and legitimating the interests of those who see Ukrainian as the native language of all Ukrainians and as a unifying language of the Ukrainian nation and state. The multiple social experiences of the community under discussion result in a plurality of types of native language activism and its visibility in various forms in online media. These sites demonstrate that the ideology of native language activism is explicitly articulated in texts and embedded in verbal and visual practices.

The analysis of these texts addressed how the language ideology of native language activism mediates the sociocultural experiences of the community and its linguistic resources. The analyzed texts foreground the cultivation of Ukrainian as a native language of all Ukrainians in Ukraine: by way of drawing an elevated and distinct portrait of Ukrainian (i.e., language image);



by way of conceptualizing Ukrainian as in need of rejuvenation (i.e., language facelift); and by way of framing calls against indifference towards one's native language (i.e., language drive). Further, the analysis links the ideology of native language activism to the creation and representation of a particular Ukrainian national and state identity in which the Ukrainian language, as the native language of all Ukrainians, is "the key to naturalizing [and securing] the boundaries" (Kroskity, 2004, p. 509) of Ukraine for Ukrainians.

In summary, activism with respect to language(s) in Ukraine is not only visible but prominent. The addressing of the language question, construction of particular images of both Ukrainian and Russian, suggestion of the necessity for a language facelift, and promotion of the need for a language drive among various online communities are all significant. The construction of a language in need of defence, legitimization, rejuvenation, development, and promotion points to the brittle state of affairs and to the vulnerability, sensitivity, and fragility of the language situation in Ukraine.

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ENDNOTES

ⁱ Concepts discussed in this study were initially introduced in a Ukrainian language publication (Nedashkivska, 2020b). This article elaborates considerably on an initial classification and provides a more in-depth analysis of language ideologies in question.

ⁱⁱ For a detailed account of these four tendencies, see Nedashkivska (2020a).

ⁱⁱⁱ The Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine in the fall of 2004. This was a series of political events and protests against the corrupt government, as well as against electoral fraud in the 2004 presidential elections by one of the leading candidates, Viktor Yanukovich. After the second run-off, the pro-democratic candidate Victor Yushchenko was declared Ukraine's president. The reference 'Orange' was originally adopted by Yushchenko's Nasha Ukraina [Our Ukraine] party for his election campaign. Following the revolution, the colour has been used in reference to a series of political events and movements in support of democracy in the country, including its reference to the revolution.

^{iv} Note that a terminological differentiation of the concepts of 'state' and 'official' is absent in Ukraine's legal theory and practice.

^v For more detailed information on language politics after the revolution of 2004, see Kulyk (2006; 2010).

^{vi} According to Besters-Dilger (2008, p. 243), even after the Orange Revolution, 85-90% of press publications were in Russian. Yushchenko's administration was, however, credited for some important changes in regulations on language use in television, radio, and the film industry.

^{vii} For an understanding of the period preceding the Maidan revolution of 2014, during Yanukovich's presidency, see Moser (2013). This period is marked by President Yanukovich's government's program to promote Russian as the second state language in Ukraine, especially through manipulations of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Moser brings into the landscape of the language situation in Ukraine the discourses practiced and constructed by the founding of Russkii Mir, a tool of Russian politics to promote the ideology of Russianness beyond any ethnic or geographical boundaries. Moser studies the discourses associated with Russkii Mir with respect to practices of Russian in Ukraine and also Ukrainian in Russia, topics truly understudied in the field. See also Masenko (2016).

^{viii} The Maidan Revolution, or the Revolution of Dignity began in November 2013 with a series of protests promulgated by social media against the antidemocratic regime of president Yanukovich and his decision not to sign an Associate Agreement with the European Union (also



referred to as Euromaidan). These protests were massive and grew into a substantial political and social transformation of Ukraine.

ix Adapted from Roth (2019).

x In an earlier study, while classifying language ideologies, Kulyk also defines a third ideology of purity, “which translates the notion of identity/authenticity into the imperative of correspondence of language varieties and forms to a standard seen as an embodiment of the nation’s true essence” (2010, p. 84).

xi The criteria used to narrow down the corpus are: the topic of the page or site relates primarily to language and language matters in Ukraine, as evident from the title of the page or site and from major discussions; the page or site is not produced or managed by a specific institution, establishment or political entity; the site is not produced or managed by scholars; and, the creation date is in or after 2012.

xii The larger project also considered discussion threads.

xiii Bilaniuk and Melnyk also point out that “often people will designate as “native” the language that corresponds to their ethnic heritage, even if they know it poorly, in the belief that this is how things should be” (2008, p. 346).

xiv For more information on Surzhyk, see Bilaniuk (2004; 2005).

xv This initial quote has been modified since the retrieval date of November 25, 2016.

xvi Bilaniuk (2017), focusing on post-independence conversions from speaking Russian to speaking Ukrainian by Ukrainian citizens, mentions this same campaign to illustrate the ‘language matters’ ideology, discussed above.

xvii Similar calls to switch from Russian to Ukrainian are found on other sites in this study. For instance, the site *Ukrains’ka mova dlia vsikh / The Ukrainian Language for All* (2015) includes the following call: “[I will] convince and [I will] win – these are the two words, which ARE NOT POSSIBLE to pronounce in the RUSSIAN language. Speak in UKRAINIAN!” (*Ukrains’ka mova dlia vsikh*, 2018, September 23).