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Research Study

New Yugoslavia as a Diasporic State?

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ABSTRACT. This article proposes an alternative use of the notion of diaspora. Rather than address a specific identity, the main thesis explores – in Derridean spirit – a specific diasporic logic of (counter-)state partisan formation in early socialist Yugoslavia. The diasporic character of partisan Yugoslavia has to do with the harsh circumstances of World War II, when Kingdom Yugoslavia disappeared and what remained of it was occupied by diverse fasicst regimes. The People's Liberation Struggle (PLS) not only struggled against the fascist occupation but imagined a new Yugoslavia that was opposed both to the Unitarian royalist idea of integral Yugoslavism and to the current form of ethnically clean nation-states. Diasporic and partisan Yugoslavia presents an open, unfinished, and emancipatory project that continues to go beyond ethnic belonging and national identity. The deterritorialising and diasporic tendency of PLS/Yugoslavia was not based on one specific nation and did not embody one recognised language. In the last part of the article, I show how already during the 1960s in socialist Yugoslavia, another symptomatic event took place: What started as a mere linguistic scientific issue, that is, whether Serbo-Croatian was one or two languages, actually articulated a new political subjectivity (nation). Despite the demise of the federative state and socialism, there was a growing portion of the population that considered themselves Yugoslavs and not members of their respective ethnical communities, taking nostalgic refuge in the virtual state that was withering away.

RÉSUMÉ. Cet article propose une utilisation alternative de la notion de diaspora. Plutôt que d'aborder une identité spécifique, la thèse principale explore – dans l'esprit de Derrida – une logique diasporique spécifique de la formation partisane (contre-)étatique aux débuts de la Yougoslavie socialiste. Le caractère diasporique de la Yougoslavie partisane est lié aux rudes circonstances de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, lorsque le Royaume de Yougoslavie disparu et que ce qui en restait a été occupé par divers régimes fascistes. *People's Liberation Struggle* (PLS) n'a pas seulement affronté l'occupation fascite, mais a imaginé une nouvelle Yougoslavie qui s'opposait à la fois à l'idée royaliste unitarienne de la Yougoslavie intégrale et à la forme actuelle d'États-nations ethniquement propres. La Yougoslavie diasporique et partisane présente un projet ouvert, inachevé et émancipateur qui continue de viser au-delà de l'appartenance ethnique et de l'identité nationale. La tendance à la déterritorialisation et à la diaspora du PLS/Yougoslavie ne s'appuyait pas sur une nation spécifique et n'incarnait pas une langue reconnue. Dans la dernière partie de cet article, je montre de quelle façon, dès les années 1960 en Yougoslavie socialiste, un autre événement symptomatique s'est produit: ce qui n'était au départ qu'une simple question scientifique linguistique, à savoir si le serbo-croate constituait une ou deux langues, a en fait articulé une nouvelle subjectivité (nationale) politique. Malgré la

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disparition de l'état fédératif et socialiste, une portion croissante de la population se considérait comme yougoslaves et non comme des membres de leurs communautés ethniques respectives, se réfugiant avec nostalgie dans l'État virtuel qui dépérissait.

Keywords: *dispersive state, diasporic state, deterritorialisation, Yugoslavia as utopian project, withering away, federation, crisis of nation-state, Jacques Derrida.*

NEW YUGOSLAVIA AS A DIASPORIC STATE?

When thinking about diaspora and Yugoslavia, there exist many associations and possible paths of research, especially after the period of 1991. For example, one could trace historical diasporas that settled in North America due to the end of feudalism and crisis of agriculture in the second part of 19th century; another pertinent analysis could survey the right-wing "ethnical" diasporas that fled from partisans and socialist Yugoslavia immediately after World War II and that settled mostly in Australia and Argentina; then, during the time of socialist Yugoslavia, another strong and often named as *Yugoslav* cultural and economic diaspora emerged in 1960s, and 1970s consisted of hundreds of thousands migrant workers that decided to stay in western Europe (mostly in Austria and Germany). However, many researchers opted for analysis of the last wave unleashed with the civil wars during the 1990s.[i] Interestingly, this wave of migration—now still continuing during the increasing economic hardships—has been accompanied by a reverse movement, since a part of a right-wing diaspora was repatriated in post-Yugoslavia. Harsh economic conditions, demontage of socialist welfare state, and unstable political conditions can be seen as the major reason that flow of youth and education in the Balkans have not really ceased in the last two decades. Looking in retrospect, the whole 20th century and the case of Yugoslavia can then be read through massive waves of internal displacements, exiles, migrations, and creation both of different type of states and diasporas—cultural, political, economic, and ethnical—due to the wars and revolutions.[ii]

Such an all-encompassing historical-sociological study of Yugoslavia and diaspora is necessary but by far exceeds the scope, time, and knowledge of the author of these lines. What this text does is intervene into the debate of diaspora in relation to partisan Yugoslavia launching a Derridean hypothesis on the language and paradoxical relation between owning, belonging, (not) being at home. I depart from a counter-intuitive, one could argue even anti-Derridean question: Can a state (Yugoslavia) be defined as diasporic?[iii] My hypothesis gives an affirmative question on the condition we give diasporic its original meaning: *dispersive*. This implies first to relativise the "eternal" status of state in social/political theory. One can dismantle this by surveying historically how the form of political authority and entities during the 20th century died and were re-born or appeared in different forms. Moreover, this hypothesis aims to trace the process of "withering away" of state, "wondering" between that works on specific "deterritorializing" logic traced in the partisan, and socialist Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was never "at home" with herself but has been a dispersive and unfinished project.

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The operation to displace emancipatory diasporic figure and logic onto the state can at first be seen as controversial, especially if we take a more general frame of a fair amount of diaspora studies. The latter depart from a binary constellation, where on the one side, we deal with a diasporic group that is often perceived as victim, while on the other side, we analyse a rigid state that imposes a set of rules and norms to be followed. State plays prominently in the diaspora studies and became, in a similar vein as in mainstream political science, the most important political category that is taken for granted, almost perceived as a sort of "eternal" political form. State is a sovereign authority that exerts control over its subjects and borders, and it also has a capacity to impose a set of strict norms and procedures (assimilation, integration, adjustment, exchange) that regulate the flows of migrations and (non)recognition of rights of diasporas. State, in these terms, is an objective and vertical agent—be it a sending or a receiving state—it recognises rights or sanctions, and in the worst case, it deports and strips rights of members of diaspora(s). In this perspective, my departing question indeed seems controversial: If one takes a state to be a diasporic, dispersive, deterritorialising entity, does that not mean one already abolishes the state itself and its most potent feature of sovereignty with clear borders, territory, and rules?

At least two last centuries of political philosophy (e.g., Magun, 2020), one might even say the whole political Modernity, was influenced by the concept and political reality of state. This status and epistemological stance elevates state to transhistorical form and almost eternal character.[iv] As mentioned in the first paragraph, if we take Yugoslav history of the 20th century seriously, then we will not see any stable political form, but an array of constant displacements and heterogeneous dispersions of political forms. The eternity of state can be at first historically challenged: from the demise of Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the first Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of Yugoslavia to partisan and socialist Yugoslavia, and finally to seven distinct nation-states under European horizon. If we add a heterogeneous experimentation with economic and ideological formations within these seemingly homogenous blocks (see Kirn, 2019), we get a sense how intense systemic changes and reforms in a short 20th century had been for people living on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Then, there is nothing like a methodological certainty of ethnonationalist "Providence" that can be applied retrospectively to all previous historical periods. The current notion and existence of nation-state and its monoethnical and monolinguistic hegemony has had a strong ideological effect in reinforcing ethnical identity and creating more homogenised diaspora(s). This model is, I claim, in crisis today, while historically it was deeply challenged by the dispersive logic of early Yugoslavia. This text shall present a specific period of political experimentation from the partisan resistance in WWII and a split with Stalin to workers' self-management as the most potent exemplifications of "diasporic" state.

The main body of the text consists of three parts: In the first part, I present a historical emergence of partisan Yugoslavia created during the People's liberation struggle based on the principles of deterritorialisation, federalisation, and popular forms of self-governance. Also, I point to specific ambivalence of the notion of "narod" that can be understood/translated both as

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nation and as people. In the second part, I theorise the main features of the self-management project and its paradoxical insistence on decentralisation and the "withering away". The Yugoslav self-management, ideally, aimed at abolishing both capitalism and state apparatus. This is what I call a "diasporic" logic, the withering away of all oppressions, traced to a partisan and early self-management project in Yugoslavia. In the third part, I show that in the late 1960s, this diasporic logic and emancipatory core came to a substantial halt. It was during the first serious crisis of self-management that the alternative notion of diasporic withers away. The symptomatic event might have started as an "innocent" linguistic scientific issue that surveyed differences of Serbo-Croatian language; it concluded in the early 1970s as a political imaginary that re-ethnicised the notion of "narod" and made the first case for anti-socialist and anti-Yugoslav project. Language became a strong weapon in intensifying tensions in the interrepublican relations. The final blow to multilingual, federal, and transnational projects evidently came in the early 1990s with the ethnic civil wars, which resulted in ethnically cleansed entities. New citizens started celebrating that they speak their own language and affirmed their supposedly "lost" and dreamt national identities—as if in the former state they were not allowed to speak their own language or hold onto their recognised minority or other rights. Thus, the 1990s saw an age that produced more and deeper ethnical differences, languages saw inventions of new words in order to strengthen the difference between new nation-states and respective minorities/diasporas. I will conclude by evoking the most recent project in the former Yugoslavia called *Declaration of common language,* which was signed by different intellectuals, linguists, activists from all different parts that aims to re-establish linguistic and cultural ties against the decades long weaponisation of ethnical and linguistic differences.

FROM PARTISAN YUGOSLAVIA TO SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA: BROTHERHOOD, UNITY, AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE WITHERED AWAY?

How was it possible that People's Liberation Struggle (PLS) could, in such dire circumstances of fascist occupation and local collaboration, not only wage a military fight but also organise a set of durable political counter-institutions that constructed an imaginary of a new world, new Yugoslavia? Yugoslav PLS was relying on its own partisan forces that were always on the move, employing guerrilla warfare tactics, however, already from very early stages of war, PLS created "liberated territories" (see Figure 1 in the **Appendix**). The latter had their own political and cultural organisations that aimed to empower the local population and armed them for military and symbolic struggle (see Kirn, 2020; Komelj, 2009). The first liberated territories appeared as early as September 1941 (Užice Republic), existed for various sequences from one to three months, while many that were liberated in 1943 remained liberated for one to two years up until the liberation of the whole country. To understand the radical novelty of partisan Yugoslavia, I will emphasise the major contributions that shook the then existing forms and visions of political governance epitomised in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (with its government in exile), a local collaborationist visions (Chetniks, Home Guards, etc.), and regimes (NDH – Ustasha fascist puppet state). The key contribution of Yugoslav PLS was inventive in its dialectical movement

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between popular and national liberation, which entailed an emancipatory and liberatory movement of the exploited and oppressed groups related to class, nation, and gender. Also, importantly the recent popularisation of fascist theorist Carl Schmitt's (2004) theory of the partisan politics stresses the central feature of all partisan struggles: Partisan belongs to the soil, what Schmitt calls "telluric", while I prefer to argue oppositely that Yugoslav partisan struggle was marked by a strong deterritorialisation, the constant change of territory, and winning over population in struggle for social transformation for a very different *motherland* (Kirn, 2019).

Let me point to the major historical event of the PLS in order to highlight the rupture and novelty of partisan Yugoslavia. The year 1943 was a turning point for the major part of partisan formation that together with Supreme Command and Tito found themselves besieged on the territory of Bosnia, but were able to survive all of the large-scale Nazi offensives launched throughout the spring and summer of 1943. Moreover, the majority of the Draža Mihailovic's Chetnik Army, who was by that time the legal representative of the government in exile, was defeated by Yugoslav partisans, and with Italy capitulating, and the international support shifting towards the partisans, this was a clear sign for an opening of historical possibility.[v] The Allies did not hide their political calculations with regard to the post-war European order. Yugoslavia was a part of the western as well as eastern sphere of interest; however, despite the lack of support for autonomy of future Yugoslavia representatives of the Yugoslav People's liberation struggle, entered on the path of popular self-determination.[vi] We could name this a jump into emptiness in the most crucial week for Yugoslav struggle: History was made between the 21st and the 29th of November, 1943, when the Second Meeting of Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (hereinafter, AVNOJ) took place in the liberated territories around Jajce. At this meeting, the deputies of the partisan movement from all across Yugoslavia decided on the *future* of the new political entity. The deputies—men as well as women—adopted the major political document AVNOJ Declaration, which contained the revolutionary points and represented the most significant political breakthrough of World War II for Yugoslavia. These points dealt with internal and external actors and autonomously proclaimed the independence of the anti-fascist resistance and the future system of Yugoslavia. This is why the Declaration is read as a revolutionary act, which cut off, in his absence, the King as the sovereign of the old Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The King's return and the regime of the new Yugoslavia would be decided by the people at a post-war people's referendum.[vii] The principles of the remaining points of the Declaration were no less revolutionary:[viii] First, the creation of federal and new Yugoslavia, which against the old monarchy dominated by national interests of Serbian ruling class, for the first time recognised the equality of all its nations and nationalities as well as their "right to self-determination";[ix] second, members were elected for the National AVNOJ Committee, which was declared to represent the revolutionary government, assisted, in terms of organisation, by AVNOJ and its national, regional, and local committees of the PLS; and, last but not least, Tito became a marshal and the supreme commander of the partisan movement.

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With its revolutionary principles and exerting unprecedented political autonomy, the Yugoslav partisans made a strategic and cunning move, since it pushed Allies to make a choice between the Chetniks and the partisans, and even consider leaving the space of political autonomy to the PLS and people of Yugoslavia. Instead of waiting for further negotiations and calculations from Allies, the PLS declared independence and reliance on their own people's forces. A few days later, at the Allied conference in Tehran, the partisan movement was confirmed as the only Allied and anti-fascist force in the territory of Yugoslavia.[x] The AVNOJ gesture and its subsequent international recognition attest to the fact that this recognition was fought for rather than inherited from the past sovereignty. This pivotal gesture attested not to desire to form a sovereign state, but to affirm the political autonomy of the Yugoslav partisans and confirm the partisan community-in-resistance, who was in very different locations building the political *anti*-apparatus. Ozren Pupovac (2006) nicely asserted that AVNOJ Declaration established the Yugoslav "non-state ... with the primary contradictory unity of the state apparatus and those political manifestations that are actually anti-apparatus, forms of mass people's organisation and direct democracy" (p. 20). There was a veritable cultural and political revolution taking place, and at its core was not bourgeois conception of people within the sovereign state, as well as not ethnically warriors of nations in their mono-states (the mainstream model of that time and of today). One can speak of a specific creation of "revolutionary people" that criticises any "homogenous" and identitarians notion of *people*. In the more recent political theory, especially Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Rancière made a vital contribution that posits people as internally "heterogeneous", and construct a "political universality" through a transformative process (e.g., Laclau, 2005, p. 240; Rancière, 2004). The conception of a "revolutionary people" was in Yugoslav context juxtaposed to the former institutions and conceptions of the bourgeois people fused with the clean race/nation of the new fascist apparatuses. If the fascist and nationalistic conceptions of people were permeated by *Blut und Boden* [Blood and Soil] ideology, then the partisan conception of the people was established through the people's, most widely and directly democratic, forms of authority based on international and multinational solidarity.

The very process of formation of the revolutionary people in this case contains an inherent discord, which means there was no total body of Yugoslav people that would be guided by some harmonious invisible hand of ethnicity, as well as there was a clear disagreement of the emerging popular forms with the dominant forms of the sovereign order, be it past (Kingdom of Yugoslavia) or present (fascist occupationist regime), which points to a strong *anti*-state element of revolutionary people. Despite in more recent historical revisionism, those sympathetic to the partisan struggle have attempted to read partisans as a recognition of specific nation-hood, the radical novelty of PLS cannot be translated into any form of nation-state or into a model of parliamentary democracy that can be distilled in a legal conception of state.[xi] Revolutionary people are then not to be conceived on the level of an empirical majority that is based on statistics, or in contemporary lenses, as the category to measure public opinion.[xii] Rather, the partisan movement established a political subjectivity that could not fit easily with any state apparatus and that was not fitting into the dominant narratives.[xiii] Pupovac (2008) argued that the PLS practiced a political principle, which did not only relate to "a single people or a single

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nation, but rather to all the nations and peoples within the repressive monarchic regime as well as to all the people beset by domination, whether on the basis of class, gender, nationality or religion" (p. 16). There was no primacy assigned to any ethnical identity in the Yugoslav PLS, but equality of all resisting and dispersive/diasporic communities fighting fascist occupation. This is a sort of "disjunctive synthesis" of the people and the nation, which indicates a radical incongruity and can thus not be reduced to the homogenous subject of ethnicity.

In juxtaposition to the revolutionary liberation that was based on inclusion of all in the struggle against fascism, the self-acclaimed patriotism of local fascist collaborationists that was presented as "fighting for home", was based on a homogenous and exclusive notion of ethnicity. Yugoslav partisans took seriously the concept of *popular front* suggested by Dimitrov (1975) at the 7th Congress of Comintern in 1935, which aimed to amass a diverse array of political forces except those that belonged to the fascist camp. This collective embodied the Partisan principle that was directed against the principle of the ethnic hatred of WWII and opened up a new horizon for Yugoslavia that was based on universal politics:

> The Yugoslav Partisan movement incited the first mass people's uprising in occupied Europe, and the large-scale revolutionary movements of the twentieth century (the Yugoslav Revolution was the biggest revolutionary uprising after the Spanish Civil War). (Komeji, 2009, p. 24)

Another question that seems marginal is actually of a vital importance for this text and interpretation of PLS invention, namely the semantics of the politicised notion of people and nation during WW2 and in early socialism. Part of the semantic confusion stems from the very naming of the resistance: If during the war and then in the anticolonial perspective most of the struggles received the name of "national liberation struggle," Yugoslav case should be posited within the frame of both national and popular liberation, this is why "People's liberation struggle". In Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian, the notions of *narod* [the nation] and *ljudstvo* [the people] were intermingled, but in English translation we all too often reduce the nomination to the aspect of the nation (especially after 1989-91).[xiv] This cannot be true for the Yugoslave PLS: If we reduce it to a mere *national* liberation, then Partisans would be there to liberate specific nations and aim to build a nation-state. On a certain deeper level, we could even claim there to be a political equivalence between Partisans and local fascist collaborators—at the end of the day were they not merely fighting for their soil/home? (see chapter 4 in Kirn, 2020). As analysed above, PLS puts into practice a heterogeneous political and linguistic (pluri)subjectivity of the people and all nations and nationalities on the Yugoslav territory. What I called a deterritorialising logic of PLS entails a strong *de-identification* (Rancière, 2002) process that crosses beyond national belonging: The political process of emancipation targeted all those who were excluded from political stage in the prewar times—that is, workers, peasants, women, youth, and communists (illegal party)—who, during the struggle, became the most active force that liberated the country. Communist organisation was undoubtedly the main organisational body and ideological cohesion of the PLS. Interestingly, much of the communist leadership came

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to fight to Yugoslav PLS from abroad, as communist diaspora, as part of international brigades from Spanish civil war, as those surviving the purges from Moscow 1938 and so on. It would be then wrong to identify the struggle with Communist Party, which at the start of the war counted 3,000 members and was transformed during the struggle. It would be also wrong to rely on merely one single aspect of the struggle that held more or less importance than another: neither national (a mere struggle against the occupation, a struggle for equality among nations and nationalities) nor a social (heterogeneous subject, the autonomy of liberated territories with consequences for later socialist transformation) revolutionary struggle, but one and all of these.

There is a valid reason why the Partisan movement did not call or name their activities and formation merely a Partisan army or military organisation. Rather, from the beginning onwards, it was a *struggle* that entered the centre stage, reflected in the names of the Partisan units: At times called after poets and figures from the local resistance tradition, at other times from the region where they were formed, yet also carrying the "proletarian" signifiers aligning themselves in the international workers movement. All these different denominations highlight the varied construction of a community-in-struggle, while also allowing for the political construction of an "enemy" that cannot be simply substantiated in an ethnic sense. The opponents were then not some substantive ethnic group, such as "Italians" or "Germans", but those that belonged to the political camp of fascism, local fascist collaborators included. The Yugoslav PLS represents one of the few examples of antifascist politics that developed a positive programme. The Partisan struggle affirmed a framework in which the former symbolic meanings and the old Yugoslavia gradually lost their ideological significance, and where partisan anti-state was fuelled by a proper "diasporic"/dispersive liberatory movements.

This lesson was vital for new Yugoslavia in the post-war period, when the socialist political community was being established and due to the deadlock with Stalin (in 1948), a very different orientation internally (self-management) and externally (non-aligned movement) took place. Yugoslav communists and in general elites of pre-war Yugoslavia took the geographical location of the Balkans (connected to Europe) as their primal site of foreign policy. The strategic move onto the global scene, with Yugoslav leadership's vital contribution to the non-aligned movement, performed what I would call a diasporic break. Instead of pan-Slavism and Yugoslav's "natural" orientation to the Balkans, the 1950s saw a dramatic break and truly global re-orientation to the non-aligned states. I argue that this new orientation to non-aligned policy has to do with Yugoslav own legacy of partisan decolonisation process from fascist occupation and also with the resilience against the interest of great powers.[xv]

There is no doubt that the birth of new socialist and federative Yugoslavia is immensely indebted to the experience of the liberation struggle, it was Tito and Communist Party of Yugoslavia that received a clear mandate backed by election and popular enthusiasm for the leading of new political entity and starting the process of reconstruction of a country completely destroyed by the war. At the same time, it has to be said that Communist Party moved towards a gradual elimination of institutions of PLS and their autonomy, styling itself according to its Soviet ally

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(Rusinow, 1977). Industrialisation and collectivisation became the key policies after the war, and a strong economic partnership with Soviet Union was the basis of the after-war reconstruction.

However, political and economic partnership came to a halt in 1948. There were some conflicts between Soviet and Yugoslav leadership during the World War II, while the postwar conflict was expressed on the question of Greece (Yugoslav communists harboured and opened borders for Greek communists) and on the question of the future autonomy of the Balkans (Yugoslavia aimed to establish Balkan Socialist Federation together with Bulgaria and Albania; see Kirn, 2019). Looking in retrospect, the split with Stalin seems the most evident result of these conflicts, however, for a great majority of Yugoslav communists and in the whole international arena at that time, the split with Stalin was a great shock.[xvi] The Cominform was an alliance of the eastern socialist countries led by Stalin, and a competing alliance to western-led alliance of capitalist states in NATO, it was also the only alliance into which socialist Yugoslavia entered. The exclusion from the alliance represented a huge blow to Yugoslavia, as it became isolated in a matter of weeks. In reality that meant that Yugoslavia was neither affiliated with the west nor the east, and since in 1947 Yugoslavia rejected the Marshall Plan, the split with Stalin meant that the first Soviet loans amounting to US$135 million, which were aimed at developing the industry were cancelled.

Despite the initial shock in the circles of Yugoslav socialist leadership, such dire circumstances yet again signalled time of "partisan times", where political capacity of leadership and its ability to build a link to masses was tested yet again. Yugoslavia now proclaimed a new path, which, according to Catherine Samary went from defense to attacking the Soviet "non-withering of the state, which was analysed in contradiction with the construction of socialism or at least as a threat to the socialist future" (Samary, 1988). The rupture with Stalin demanded a thorough re-examination of the (socialist) state and its role in the transition towards a communist society. As a solution to the troublesome merger of the Party with the State, the Yugoslav minister of economy and one of the most prolific political theorists Boris Kidrič, advocated the "withering away of the state" (p. 117). Yugoslavia, still fuelled by the experiences of liberation struggle and resistance to meddling in its internal affairs, proclaimed a new variation of anti-state project coined as the "workers' self-management." Stalinism was a synonym for any sort of centralisation and concentration of power, economic and political, and this is why Yugoslav (now renamed) League of Communists announced a series of reforms that would delegate authorities from federation to republics, from republics to municipal and communal levels on the one side, and from a command planned economy to workers' councils in the sphere of production. In the long-term, utopian perspective, capitalism, state, and even the Party were to wither away and be substituted by the associations of (re)producers that would self-manage social life. New self-management polity became projective and dispersive, that is, built on a critique of both capitalist and socialist states, aiming to dismantle any dominant ethnical group or nationalist ideology, any political and economic monopoly of power. Paradoxically, and despite the best intentions on the part of the new political elite, this withering away was all along guided by the Party, and

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remained sometimes more, sometimes less visible agent of the "avant-garde logic" (see Lebowitz, 2012).

The politics of language, and the way language was weaponised, and one could argue the general politicisation of (national) culture was an important part of the political awakening of the "imagined communities," national and transnational (Slavic) around and after 1848 in the Balkans. South Slavic languages were important markers of differentiation within the crumbling Monarchy and Empire, and served as vehicles for alternative political and cultural imaginaries. It was after the WWI, that is, already during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and also in socialist Yugoslavia, that Serbo-Croatian language became the *lingua franca* across all the country, while other languages were mostly practised within their republics (e.g., Slovenian in socialist republic of Slovenia, Macedonian in socialist Republic of Macedonia). In 1954, the major linguists of Yugoslavia adopted a hypothesis that Serbo-Croatian was a single language with two variants.[xvii] In more practical terms, those living in Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Bosnian/Herzegovinian republics all spoke a "common language", referred to as "naški" [ours] in different variations, which everyone understood. New Yugoslavia was not based on one nation, and was definitely not a country of one language; however, people constantly translated their own vernacular languages into the common language. This process of travelling between, especially South Slavic languages, perhaps showed on the linguistic side of the unfinished political project of Yugoslavia. There was this ambivalent push for transnational identity that was class-based ("working people") that had this peculiar legacy of partisan struggle (national and popular liberation), which rather than one "identity" (Yugoslavism), kept producing various political, cultural, and economic belongings. As mentioned, these belongings were primarily related to class, but also to the categories of nation and gender.

At this point, I would like to introduce an important thesis on diaspora and language by French deconstructionist philosopher Jacques Derrida. Famous for prioritising writing over speech, his philosophical investigation on language cannot be overlooked for anyone interested in critical and literary theory. Derrida has always placed a strategic ambivalence on his own political "identity"—Algerian Jew affected by fascist collaborationist regime of Vichy during World War II that interrupted his school—he has openly promoted diaspora over national state, also in the case of Israel. Moreover, he did not want to easily be identified with one language community despite excelling in French language and teaching at the centre of French philosophy (l'École normale supérieure). The thesis that I would like to use was developed in his work "*Monolingualism of the other: Or, the prosthesis of origin*" (1998), where he claims that there is a specific (non)belonging to any language: We speak one language, but we do not own it. Moreover, Derrida's thesis on diaspora in particular resonates with early Yugoslav experiences: Yugoslavia being isolated from capitalist west and being excluded from socialist east, having no home any more in the Balkans, while also as a new state not possessing merely one language. However, this departing paradox—in a specific situation, speaking one language, but not owning it—resonates with the major contribution of Yugoslav self-management; as a critique of Soviet nationalisation of the means of production (state property and control), in Yugoslavia, a step

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further was seen in "socialisation" of means of (re)production. Self-management instituted a peculiar form of property, social property that was neither from the state, nor owned by anyone - but in the specific situation it could be used by everyone. Let me refer to Derrida (1998):

> We speak only one language - and that we do not own it. We only ever speak one language - and, since it returns to the other, it exists asymmetrically, always for the other, from the other, kept by the other. Coming from the other, remaining with the other, and returning to the other. (p. 40)

The fundamental operation of alienation and splitting on different nations and nationalities, which were related and understood the "common language," became a vector in Yugoslavian diasporic state that was aimed to wither away and give way to associations of producers and citizens. Furthermore, the new home for self-managers and their goal became displaced into the future, into a life in a classless and stateless society. It cannot be doubted that the first two decades of new Yugoslavia (1948-1965) brought relative successes in political and economic experimentation of self-management, a veritable social infrastructure materialised in well functioning health, educational, cultural, and sport systems, with a growing industrial output. The deeper utopian implications that aimed for interrepublican solidarity and socialisation of means of (re)production were deeply ingrained in the new country as a state of workers and working people.

That said, one should not idealise these early phases of Yugoslavia as if nations and nationalities, conflicts, and contradictions disappeared and actually withered away. After the war, new Yugoslavia officially recognised six different nations (all South Slav) and a range of nationalities (Hungarian and Albanian, as the biggest, and nine other smaller nationalities), which was to a large degree reflected in the structure of six republics and two autonomous regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo) both formed within socialist republic of Serbia. In linguistic terms, I already mentioned *lingua franca*, Serbo-Croatian, or a common language in different variations that coexisted with other (vernacular) languages, Macedonian and Slovenian that was used in all institutions and their respective republics, while Albanian language became only recognised through struggles and founding of own University in Prishtina within the autonomous republic of Kosovo in 1969.

ANTINOMIES OF YUGOSLAV WITHERING AWAY: DIASPORIC LOGIC REVERSED?

The late 1960s were marked by a true political, ideological, and economical crisis. After the introduction of "market reform" in 1965 (Samary, 1988), the decentralisation received a very centrifugal character: The withering of central state capacities resulted in the gradual disappearance of solidarity between the republics and the exhaustion of the emancipatory idea of a socialist Yugoslavia. Market reform was perhaps effective in targeting further economic monopoly, but the central mechanism that substituted the party (and more centrally organised

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planning) became market and increasing dependence on foreign credits and imports. After two decades of economic growth and development, the mid-1960s brought soaring unemployment, a rising competition between workers and non-workers, and between companies, which indicated a return to proto-capitalist logic. This decline of socialism also disclosed an antagonistic relationship between the new ruling liberal constellation of technocrats and bureaucrats on the one side, and workers on the other side. The most exposed social group were non-workers, which left the country en masse and became labour power at the flexibilising markets of western Europe. In Yugoslavia, liberalism emerged from the unproblematic acceptance of the logic of self-management development associated with the names of decentralisation and the market. Liberalism gained its political expression in the middle of the 1960s when the federal regulation renounced the solidarity between the republics. Jasna Dragović-Sosso (2002) was right when she claimed that "different conceptions of Yugoslavisms in the course of the 1960s as essentially unifying notions were effectively abandoned … in favour of the affirmation of Yugoslavia's national diversity and the call for economic decentralisation" (p. 29). The fact that the political bureaucracy was losing its social power did not mean that this power was assumed by the workers. The new holders of social power were to be found predominantly within the triangle between the directors of companies, new (commercial!) banks, and local political functionaries, who were politically active in the republics, and supported regional development that consequently enhanced national awareness.[xviii] This also explains an array of conflicts around the distribution of the national product and of foreign currency. The new idea was market driven and meritocratic instead of first and foremost investing into the poorer parts. The new balance of power led to the first paralysis of the federation and the crisis of national relations between the republican and federal institutions.[xix]

As various and more recent critical studies indicated the nationalist ideologies never truly disappeared, not even during the early period of self-management.[xx] Moreover, the anti-Albanian (and anti-Roma) sentiment had been present in everyday ideology as well as in the official political constitution of the new Yugoslavia. In particular, the question of Kosovo remained the weakest and one of the most racially and nationally loaded topics of socialist times. One should acknowledge a very long history of failures and un-realised potentialities from the early negotiations between the Albanian and Yugoslav communists on the possibility of a Balkan Socialist Federation (according to this view Kosovo would join Albania in its own federal unit) to the project of a never completely "autonomous" region of Kosovo. Let us bear in mind that Kosovo was formed *within* the Socialist Republic of Serbia. We can trace a longer history of political antagonism and an extremely unfavourable economic position that pushed a part of the local bureaucracy in Kosovo to resort to nationalist positions during the 1960s. At the end of that decade, multiple voices demanded Kosovo be granted a more equal status within Yugoslavia, which implied the proclamation of the seventh republic (Magaš, 1993). The protests were suppressed, and the initial federalist concept of "brotherhood and unity" was replaced by Kardelj's confederal and more autonomous concept of self-management (Jović, 2009, pp. 62–81). Despite some positive results of this shift, the ethical question and a sort of identity politics was coming to the fore. This was not merely a secondary expression of economic disparities,

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but rather an increasingly articulated political conflict and a part of the long-term cultural hegemony that would play a vital role in re/de/forming of the federation and project of Yugoslavia.

I would like to highlight another important linguistic event, which was first deemed as a purely scientific matter. If, in 1954, linguists adopted a hypothesis that Serbo-Croatian was a single language with two variants, it was in 1967 when this hypothesis was contested by *Matica hrvatska*.[xxi] The latter argued for the separation and restoration of Croatian and Serbian as two autonomous languages. The scientific discussion was followed by the demand for the official recognition of this separation, while in Serbia a group of intellectuals, cultural workers, and linguists started to defend the thesis of one nation and one language. This discussion was a controversial and symptomatic indication of how "science" becomes political, and how language can weaponise the future (and past) imaginaries of the country, belonging, and identity. In political reality, these linguistic demands backed the beliefs of the right-wing circles that called for more republican sovereignty and a weaker federation. As Hrvoje Klasić (2012) pointed out in his analysis, *Matica hrvatska* became one of the key cultural-political centres of the national renaissance and a catalyst for a mass movement already at the beginning of the 1970s. Certain historians and interpreters believe that the Maspok movement (in original *masovni pokret,* literally translated as "mass movement") was the main representative of the "right-wing deviation". However, I argue that it is more appropriate to consider it as the beginning of an organised nationalist politics. Maspok brought together intellectuals, liberals from the League of Communists, and students, while it also received support from the League of Communists of Croatia, who then used certain Maspok arguments in their struggle against the "forces of centralisation". When the liberal demands for more (marker) freedom got articulated within the national(-ist) horizon, socialist policies started withering away. What seemed for some as progressive demands at first soon became associated with a more conservative ideology. This fits into the reading of Maspok as a right-wing response to the failed left-wing revolution of 1968. Moreover, it was precisely on Maspok ideological grounds that the anti-hegemonic forces, which—due to the growing popularity of the nationalist ideology—contributed to the mounting tensions and conflicts in the ethnically mixed regions (e.g., in Krajina), in which the majority of the population was Serbian. The original demands for linguistic separation were joined by the economic demands for foreign exchange sovereignty and the political demands for Croatian independence. The nationalist movement now associated the linguistic dissimilarity of the Croatian language with a clear political identifier: Croatian nation. In a more radicalised way, this ideological trope becomes a part of the imagery of the ethnically pure territory that would be a sad reality of the 1990s.

The nationalist outbursts cannot be considered merely as an expression of the economic crisis, or, in Freudian lingo, a "return of the repressed." At the beginning of the 1970s, the socialist leadership faced mass—on occasions even anti-communist—public criticism for the first time since World War II. These policies should then not be referred to as a deviation, but as an emergence of the politics of a radically opposite political imagination. The ideological formation

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of the nationalist movements consisting of anti-communist and traditionalist components, references to nationalist culture. By 1971, the situation was out of control, as Tito openly underlined in his speech: "Would you like to return to 1941? This would be a true disaster" (in Rusinow, 1977, p. 299). In the following months, the nationalist movement was repressed, some of the leaders were arrested and sentenced to prison, and a major part of the leadership of the political apparatus of the League of Communists of Croatia was subjected to a thorough purge (Repe, 1992, p. 250). In this case, the reaction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Tito's leadership circle was no different than it was in the case of repressing the left-wing deviation. Titoist leadership failed to resolve the social question (e.g., growing inequalities between regions, unemployed, Gastarbeiter) and national issues that surfaced under the proclaimed brotherhood and unity and federal structure. In the short-term, the purges managed to re-establish political control of Titoists. However, this brought an end to the relative freedom of political, cultural, and media expression, and resulted in a more consistent control over the cultural apparatuses and artistic production. From the long-term perspective, we can claim that the repression revealed the lack of ideological hegemony of the old partisan generation. The once diasporic character—withering away of capital, state, nationalist ideology—of the early Yugoslavia was now defeated. The clearest indicator of loss of emancipatory orientation was also the fact that the old partisan generation was no longer able to rule without resorting to force and increasingly rely on Tito's personality.

Moreover, it was in 1974 that the diasporic character of Yugoslavia was officially defeated. The New Constitution of SFYR brought forward a new confederal orientation that openly emphasised ethnic identity as a political stipulation. Republican entities received de facto state sovereignty (not in the diplomatic and army matters). The leadership actually made an ideological compromise with the (purged) right-wing deviation,[xxii] which pointed to an internal disintegration of socialist orientation. Yugoslav political leadership made no step into renovating the emancipatory project and introducing a set of demands made by the left-wing communists, workers' opposition of 1968. Rather, it came to terms with the technocrats and nationalist imaginary of increasingly republicanised (and less federalised) entities. The ideological amalgam of liberalism and nationalism was temporarily defeated in the early 1970s, while I claim (Kirn, 2019) that it should be seen as a key ideological and political agent-forming the historical bloc- that was victorious at the end of the 1980s. What started as a minor and linguistic question on the nature of Serbian-Croatian language pushed into direction on separation of languages that helped revive the (elitist) national culture. In the 1980s, this politics of language already developed an alternative model of the political constitution that did not have much in common with the class and federal entity of socialist Yugoslavia and the working people. The old model of "one nation in one state" resurfaced. This model—as the name clearly indicates—promotes the nation as the romantic(ist) subjectivity that is fuelled by culture and ethnic substance and that finds its most appropriate political form in the *national state*. This prepared the stage for the imaginary and political form of new nation-states, which became a reality in the early 1990s. And we did not only receive new states, but also new languages—Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin—and many new ethnical minorities and diasporas that were taken as a

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"foreign" element in the mono-ethnical territory. The once alternative diasporic and dispersive character of transnationalist legacy of the Yugoslav federation was thrown in the dustbin of history, and the old traditional sovereignist nation-state came to shine through ethnical wars.

CONCLUSION: DECLARING COMMON LANGUAGE IN POST-YUGOSLAVIA?

This text displaces the notion of diaspora from a particular group onto the specific formation of partisan and (early) socialist Yugoslavia by highlighting the emancipatory and dispersive logic. Departing from the People's Liberation Struggle during WWII that performed a dialectical movement between national and popular liberation, liberating ever new territories, while the experience and organisation of partisan resistance was predominantly relying on its own forces. In this respect, the PLS practised a political autonomy and self-governance that already inscribed the alternative diasporic dimension into the core of its after-war project. I claimed that non-aligned movement as a sort of displacement of the "natural" foreign policy stranded to the Balkan shore can be seen as a sort of continuation of partisan politics with other means. While also, internally, splitting with Stalin brought a new Yugoslav independent path to socialism: Workers' self-management. Therefore, the New Yugoslavia ascribed to the utopian idea of withering away of the capital, state, nationalist ideology while already forming a specific temporally dis-placed community, utopia of association of (re)producers that was managing with the social property (not the state!).

In the second part, the text pointed the key contradictions of the Yugoslav self-management during market reform (after 1965) and reasons—linguistic, ideological, political, and economical—where and why the deteriorialising logic became ethnically and economically re-territorialised in the constitution of 1974. Thus, despite some important achievements of socialist self-management, the centrifugal forces of nationalism, market, and undemocratic tendencies within party apparatuses continuously blocked its own project. Ignorance and repression of national question in the period of dismantling its own solidarity project between republics struck back with vengeance in the 1980s and in certain way, socialism and Yugoslavia already after the death of Tito in 1980 becomes a nostalgic project, in which some guest workers might dream of at a distance, some workers at home practice, and some intelligentsia and politicians still sincerely believed in. But what won was a political actualisation of mono-ethnicity and mono-religion in one state with its own mono-language. The diaspora was then seen only through the "ethnical" belonging. The civil wars in the 1990s not only brought immense human suffering, but also did everything in power to bury alternative utopian, diasporic, partisan, and socialist practices, and visions to the dustbin of history. Proliferation and strengthening of ethnical differences in the neoliberal conditions robbed people of their own histories: that they relied on their own forces bringing down both fascist occupation and crumbling socialist authority in 1980s.

Today, after decades of retraditionalisation, nationalist revisionism, and at places even rehabilitation of local fascism (Kirn, 2019), there have been only a few cultural and political projects that aimed to

reconnect and rebuild a solidarity beyond a mere nostalgia in former Yugoslavia. In the context of language and diaspora, the most interesting recent project is unquestionably a collective publication titled "Declaration of common language", the result of research and discussion between various students, expert, and participants in the research project "Languages and Nationalisms" (2016). The declaration arose within the context of the young people's initiative that wanted to theorise and politicise linguist-ethnical segregation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the school system harbours two systems under the same roof (one for Croats, other for Bosnian Muslims). Furthermore, this declaration on the one hand demands the existence of common language in its four variations, while on the other hand gives its political community freedom to retain any of these four variations. The declaration was signed by hundreds of linguists, social theorists, and historians, which steered some public controversy and attack by fervent defenders of national substance. In this respect, Boris Buden (2018) spotted what he calls "the central and productive paradox" of the declaration: If the text rightfully affirms the existence of a common language that is spoken by Bosnians, Montenegrians, Croatians and Serian, this is a scientific fact, then the "practical fact that any of these four variations is called an own language is a nationalist illusion." The declaration does not go far enough to challenge the conventionality and politicality of drawing the borders of any language (for a fine elaboration on this problem, see Buden, 2018). In the post-Yugoslav situation, this paradoxical assertion pushes us to recognise the recurrent use of ethnical weaponisation of the language, and leaves us with a conclusion that the language cannot be harboured in a scientific and protected sphere of inquiry, but if something, we need to undertake a critical investigation on the linkage between politics, cultural, and ideological spheres. In the post-Yugoslav constellation, it has very precise political consequences that can help dismantle nationalist mythologies and uncritical assertions of ethno-methodological hegemony (Woodward, 2003). Such critical research can, instead focus on ethnical diaspora, bring us back to the alternative diasporic understanding of deterritorialising home and language. There can be no simple and uncritical return to the past (Yugonostalgia), but taking critical lessons of past Yugoslav project is urgent for any alternative diasporic and cosmopolitan vision of the post-Yugoslavia, which has been in protracted economic and political crisis since the mid of 1980s.

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APPENDIX



Figure 1. Map of Europe in May 1943, from the textbook *Hronologija NOB 1941–1945*: Green denotes Axis-occupied territory, pink denotes Allied territories, and violet denotes the liberated territories of the Partisans in Yugoslavia.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jugoslavija_i_Evropa_maj_1943.jpg.

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Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnicity

Ethnic Group	Population (in thousands)
Serbs	8,141
Croats	4,428
Muslims	2,000
Albanians	1,731
Slovenes	1,754
Macedonians	1,342
Montenegrins	579
"Yugoslavs"	1,209
Hungarians	427
Others	818
Total	22,428

SOURCE: 1981 census.

Figure 2. Population of Yugoslavia registered by the census in 1981 (see especially the number of Yugoslavs),
Source: Mrđjen (see reference list: http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0038–982x/2002/0038–982X0201077M.pdf)

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ENDNOTES

i One extensive study of 200 narratives of members of Yugoslav diaspora to the UK was done by Munro (2017). From a more psychological perspective and interethnic relationship within diaspora, see Martinović et al. (2018).

ii I rely on a good overview of the concept and typology of diaspora(s) in Anteby-Yemini and Berthomière (2005).

iii In different places, Derrida points to the political and philosophical preference of (Jewish) Diaspora over the state of Israel, exile and wandering over nationality (e.g., Derrida, 1978).

iv The relationship between transhistorical/eternal and what presents itself as the most evident agent/process is indicative of a strong ideological sedimentation that also the scientists do not always escape. This link was explored among other theorists, by French philosopher Louis Althusser.

v More surprisingly, Stalin made several demands for Tito's partisans to cooperate with the Chetniks and renounce the revolutionary struggle in the liberated territories. For more information on the complex and ambivalent relations between the partisans and Allies, see Bilandžić (1980) and Kardelj (1980).

vi In 1945, Yalta's conference matters became open: a sphere of interest Yugoslavia was divided equally (50–50) between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Greece, for example, was 90 per cent British and 10 per cent Soviet, which had tragic consequences once World War II finished. These new imperialist divisions took place without any involvement of the local resistance movements (Fejto, 1952, p. 25), which is another dimension to look after within the context of World War II is valid. See also Gluckstein (2012).

vii Refer to Nešović and Pagon (1973).

viii The AVNOJ Declaration opens with the following sentence: 'On the basis of every nation's right to self-determination, including the right to secession or unification with other nations, and in accordance with the true disposition of all Yugoslav nations, expressed during the three-year joint People's Liberation Struggle that forged an indivisible brotherhood of all nations of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia hereby issues the following Decree' (Nešović and Pagon, 1973, p. 238).

ix With one important exception, as the question of Albanians in Kosovo was already a pressing issue during the war. The Albanian anti-fascist activists and partisans were leaning towards the idea of merging with Albania, while the Communist Party of Yugoslavia tried to postpone this issue until after the war. Kosovo was also the only area in which armed resistance took place

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after the partisans had already liberated it: in February 1945. The Kosovo question remained at the core of the dispute between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Albania (see Magaš, 1993, pp.33–34). Regardless of the political and revolutionary nature of project Yugoslavia, which was open to all nationalities, we cannot ignore the culturological and symbolic restriction of the very name Yugoslavia, which refers to the place and adherence of all South Slavs. The only political imaginary to solve the issue of really all nations and nationalities was advocated by Tito, Hoxha, and Dimitrov after the war in the creation of Balkan Socialist Federation, which was soon after stopped by Stalin (see Karamanić, 2009; Kirn, 2019).

x A year later the King of Yugoslavia and a part of the government-in-exile publicly supported the partisan struggle, calling upon the population to join the PLS. The Allies, especially Churchill, strove to ensure that the partisan leadership formed as broad a government as possible, which would include a part of the government-in-exile and pave the way for the general transition to the new Yugoslavia. On 8 March 1945, Tito and Šubašić signed an agreement that appeased the British and formally brought together all political forces. This was a compromise with a calculation that the British forces would refrain from interfering in the internal matters of Yugoslavia after the war.

xi For an important critique of liberal subjectivity and the state, see Balibar (2002).

xii At the end of the war the Yugoslav partisan forces consisted of almost a million fighting men and women, making them the largest resistance army of World War II. Besides the Ukrainian partisans and the Polish Resistance Army, the Yugoslav partisan army was the most numerous also in the absolute sense.

xiii It was in this sense that Althusser criticised the representatives of the social contract and their categories most resolutely, as they already a priori represented a precisely defined and specific political system (Althusser, 2006).

xiv The Slovenian language distinguishes between people [ljudstvo] and nation [narod], even though in political and theoretical texts these two concepts are used interchangeably and we should interpret them with regard to the specific context (Komelj, 2009). In the Serbo-Croatian-Bosnian language, the difference between nation and people is sometimes blurred, as the word is the same: narod. For more information on the historical development of the concepts of nation, nationality and ethnicity in the Yugoslav context, see Banac (1984, pp. 23–27). Banac's (1984) study also argues that nationalism is a modern concept and situates the development of national awareness in the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, occasionally his thesis transforms into emphasising nationalist ideology as an eternal and ahistorical formation. Karl Deutsch offers a more precise definition of nationalities as groups of people on the path towards their political, economic and cultural autonomy (Deutsch, 1996). During World War II, a variety of terms were used in the Partisan struggle with the exception of the French version of the

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nation or the unitarian Yugoslav nation, which has had an exceedingly negative connotation since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

xv This angered Stalin, who demanded that Tito call off the temporary revolutionary government (Ramet, 2006, pp. 157–159). Naturally, AVNOJ and the Supreme Headquarters refused to abolish this founding act, and a year later during the liberation of Belgrade and parts of Vojvodina, the Red Army requested permission to carry out joint military operations. Even though the Yugoslav Resistance Movement received material aid from the Allies, we could state that it managed to defeat the Nazi occupiers with its own forces. In Europe, the Greek People's Liberation Army, ELAS, was the only other resistance movement to manage the same.

xvi In the angry exchange of letters between Stalin (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and Tito (the CPY), the Yugoslav response on 13 April 1948 sent a clear "no" to Stalin and instead of the self-criticism and subjection to the expected line it opted to take a different path. In that conjuncture, this meant that the Yugoslav leadership found itself in front of an abyss and decided to leap into the void, a situation confirmed two months later: on 28 June, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and became internationally isolated.

xvii Such was the agreement between the linguists and cultural workers in 1954 in Novi Sad (Dragović-Sosso, 2002, p. 32).

xviii See Woodward (1995).

xix The demand of the Croatian political leadership for a less centralised approach regarding the management of foreign currency, which originated mainly from tourism, may be a sound economic argument, however, it neglects the aspect of federal investments, joint debts, and efforts to construct the tourist infrastructure.

xx See the collection of texts Serbia and Albanians (1989), which focus on the history of Albanian–Serbian relations, especially the texts by Dimitrije Tucović, founder of the Serbian Social Democratic Party.

xxi Matica Hrvatska is the oldest independent Croatian national institution. Its main goals are to promote Croatian national and cultural identity in the fields of art, science, spiritual creativity, economy, and public life as well as to care for the social development of Croatia.

xxii Even if at the same time, the phenomenon of the Yugoslav super-identity—people who would declare themselves as Yugoslavs and not as belonging to ethnical identity – was noticeable and became stronger in all parts of the federation during the 1980s (Mrdjen, 2002, see Figure 2 in the **Appendix**), it involved the unfinished process of the Yugoslav project as well as the work of Yugoslav ideological apparatuses. Yugoslavism was achieved predominantly through the

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institutions of the Yugoslav People's Army, Tito, sports games, partisan legacy and culture, as well as mixed marriages and other supranational institutions (see also Velikonja, 2009).