The Role of Educators in Supporting the Development of Refugee Students’ Sense of Belonging

SATINDER KAUR, University of Calgary
JESSICA SZORENYI, University of Calgary

ABSTRACT. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2018a) designates North America as a top destination for immigrants and refugees; it had received approximately 22.5 million refugees by the end of 2017, over half of which were school-aged (Lemke & Nickerson, 2020). This intake sparked our interest in exploring the role of schools in, and barriers to, the development of refugee students’ sense of belonging. The current paper reports upon a literature review conducted using thematic analysis with a critical viewpoint. A total of 25 peer- reviewed articles were included. Our research led to the emergence of four key themes: culturally responsive teacher training; culturally relevant and trauma-informed pedagogy; academic and socio-emotional support; and the impact of first language (L1) and home culture in the development of a sense of belonging. The findings of our literature review reveal an immense need to establish policy on trauma-informed, refugee education-focused professional development for teachers who work with refugees directly. Moreover, we identify a lack of culturally responsive resources and strategies for supporting the academic and socio-emotional needs of this marginalized population. Our research highlights the importance of parental involvement; positive acculturation; peer support; and teacher-student relationships, along with a need to reduce discrimination by educators, classmates, and community, in order to support the development of refugee students’ sense of belonging in the school environment.

RÉSUMÉ. Le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés a désigné l’Amérique du Nord comme la destination la plus populaire pour les immigrants et les réfugiés. Vers la fin 2017, l’Amérique du Nord aurait accueilli environ 22,5 millions de réfugiés dont plus que la moitié étaient en âge de fréquenter l’école (Lemke & Nickerson, 2020). Cette statistique a suscité notre intérêt à explorer le rôle des écoles dans le développement du sentiment d’appartenance des élèves réfugiés, ainsi que les obstacles à ce développement. Cet article rend compte d’une recension des écrits utilisant une analyse thématique et un point de vue critique. Nous avons revu un total de 25 articles évalués par les pairs. À la suite à notre recherche, quatre thèmes principaux se sont présentés : la formation des enseignants tenant compte des besoins de diverses cultures, la pédagogie tenant compte aussi bien des traumatismes que des besoins culturels, le soutien académique et socio-émotionnel, et l’influence de la langue première et de la culture familiale sur le développement d’un sentiment d’appartenance. Selon les résultats de notre recension des écrits, il s’avère très important d’établir une politique particulière au perfectionnement professionnel axée sur l’éducation des réfugiés et tenant compte des traumatismes pour les enseignants qui travaillent directement avec les réfugiés. De plus, nous avons identifié un manque de ressources et de stratégies adaptées aux besoins académiques et socio-émotionnels de ce secteur marginalisé de la population. Notre recherche souligne l’importance de la participation des parents ; d’une acculturation positive; du soutien des pairs; et des relations positives entre enseignants et leurs élèves, ainsi que la nécessité de réduire la discrimination de la part des enseignants, des camarades de classe et de la communauté afin de favoriser le développement d’un sentiment d’appartenance des élèves-réfugiés envers le milieu scolaire.

Nation, Religion, and Language Ideology: The Case of Postcolonial Bangladesh

Shaila Shams, Simon Fraser University

Abstract

Drawing on language ideology (Irvine & Gal, 2000; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994) as an analytical lens, I conduct a historical analysis of the sociocultural and political developments that led to the construction of Bangladesh as a nation-state and that have influenced people’s attitudes and beliefs toward certain languages. I argue that analyzing the construction of language ideology is important, not only for the Bangladeshi context, but also in Bangladeshi diasporic communities, to understand language practices that have been shaped by the sociopolitical and ideological developments in their home country. Immigrants’ language practices play a significant role in their language learning and settlement in the host society. Though Bangla language is at the heart of Bangladeshi nationalism (Kabir,1987), it is the শুদ্ shuddho (correct/standard) Bangla that is inculcated in the nation-building discourse. Despite nationalistic fervor around Bangla, in Bangladesh the English language has more importance in terms of functionality, power, and status. Additionally, Arabic is considered as a holy language in Muslim-majority Bangladesh. These ideological characterizations of the three languages index the identity of their users and shape their language practices and beliefs. Thus, analyzing the historical forces that contributed to the construction of the language ideologies can shed light on the language practices and language learning of Bangladeshi Bengali immigrants and their settlement.

Résumé

La nation, la religion et l’idéologie linguistique : le cas de Bangladesh post-colonial

Inspirée de l’idéologie linguistique (Irvine & Gal, 2000; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994) en tant que cadre théorique, je mène une analyse historique des développements socioculturels et politiques qui ont donné naissance à la construction du Bangladesh comme état-nation, et qui ont formé les attitudes et croyances de sa population envers certaines langues. Je propose une analyse de la construction de l’idéologie linguistique, que je considère primordiale, non seulement dans le contexte du Bangladesh en tant que pays, mais aussi dans le cas des communautés diasporiques, dont les pratiques langagières dépendent des développements sociopolitiques et idéologiques du pays d’origine. Ces pratiques langagières jouent un rôle important quand vient le temps d’apprendre les langues et coutumes des nouvelles sociétés où ces immigrants s’installent. Quoique la langue bengalie soit au cœur du nationalisme bangladais (Kabir,1987), c’est le শুদ্ shuddho bengali (la langue dite ‘standarde’) qui soit inculqué au discours de l’édification de la nation. Malgré le lien entre la langue bengalie et la ferveur nationaliste, c’est néanmoins l’anglais qui semble valoir plus en termes de puissance, statut, et utilité. En plus, la langue arabe se traite comme langue sacrée au Bangladesh, dont la religion principale est l’islam. La compréhension sociale de ces trois langues indexe les identités des locuteurs et aide à façonner leurs pratiques langagières et leurs croyances. Une analyse des forces historiques qui ont contribué à la construction des idéologies linguistiques au Bangladesh peut alors nous faire mieux comprendre les pratiques langagières et les idéologies associées à l’apprentissage d’autres langues pour les peuples bangladais immigrants, concernant leur intégration dans leurs nouveaux pays d’accueil.

Keywords: Language ideology, Bangladesh, immigrants, language, religion.

Introduction

This article reviews the historical development of Bangladesh as a nation-state and the role of language and religion in the characterization of the state in order to understand the language practices of Bangladeshi immigrants in Canada. I adopt a language ideology framework (Heath, 1989; Irvine & Gal, 1985, 2000; Kroskrity et al., 1992; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994) to critically examine relevant historical forces, their development, and their impact on the language practices of Bangladeshi immigrants in Canada. My broader research aims to explore the language learning experiences, language practices and settlement experiences of skilled Bangladeshi Bangla-speaking Muslim immigrants and how their ethnolinguistic–religious identity intersects with their integration in Canada. My language and learning epistemology has poststructural and sociocultural underpinnings. Drawing on a poststructural conceptualization of language (Bourdieu, 1991), I see language as a marker of the accumulated capitals of its speakers that signifies the embedded power relations among them. Drawing on a sociocultural theory of learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991), I see learning not only as a cognitive process, but also as a socially situated activity that requires learners’ participation in practices determined by their access to communities. In this view of language and learning, learners are social agents who bring their own perceptions and attitudes toward language(s) that are shaped by their language ideologies; therefore, understanding the language learning and practices of Bangladeshi immigrants requires insight into the perceptions and attitudes toward language(s) that shape them. Understanding perceptions and attitudes calls for a critical study of the ideologies associated with the languages in the repertoire of Bangla-speaking Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants; such ideologies are a product of historical, sociocultural, and political phenomena.

In this article, I examine the historical background, development, and birth of Bangladesh as a nation-state; the intertwining nature of language and religion in the politics of the region; and the development of the religious and linguistic identities of the Bangladeshi Bangla-speaking population of Islamic faith. I then analyze how and why language ideology serves as an appropriate lens to understand the language practices of Bangladeshi immigrants.

Immigrants and Language

Proficiency in the host country language is an essential immigration criterion and is considered by some scholars a requirement for successful social and economic integration into the host society (e.g., Adamuti-Trache, 2012; Ali & Alam, 2015; Boyd, 1990; Boyd & Cao, 2009; Chiswick & Miller, 1988; Derwing & Waugh, 2012). Despite the importance of host-language proficiency for immigrants, very few scholars have explored the language learning and integration process of skilled immigrants (Giampapa & Canagarajah 2017; Han, 2007; Victoria, 2017). Being second-language (L2) speakers of English, Bangladeshis in Canada face language issues while navigating and integrating into Canadian society. In fact, Bangladeshis are unfavourably positioned compared to other South Asians in Canada (Agarwal, 2013; BIES Report, 2013; Ghosh, 2014). Bangladeshis mostly come to Canada within the skilled migration category, meaning they have the required educational and professional experience and linguistic abilities. However, according to a 2013 research report by the Bengali Information and Employment Services (BIES) in Toronto, Bangladeshi immigrants identified lack of English language skills as a significant obstacle in seeking employment in Canada. This ultimately impacts their career related decisions and trajectories. The present study demonstrates that the language-related experience of skilled immigrants is a complex phenomenon that requires careful study. I aim to understand how Bangladeshi immigrants learn English upon immigration and what their attitudes are towards both learning English and the language itself. These underlying beliefs and perceptions toward language and language learning can be explored through the lens of language ideology.

Language Ideology

Woolard and Schieffelin (1994), in their review of existing scholarly work on language and ideologies, mentioned that, although research related to language and ideology had been dominant in the fields of cultural studies, anthropology, and sociolinguistics, studies on ideologies of language were only recently becoming a field of inquiry. Twenty-seven years later, in an increasingly globalized context, it is even more important to critically engage with the field of language ideology. Mass migration from periphery to core countries, from postcolonial regions to the colonial powers, increasing influx of refugees, rising capitalism in the Global South, new technologies, and changing political scenarios all have profound impacts on people’s lives at many levels, including individual language practices, mobility, access, and meaningful participation as social agents. On the one hand, the necessity for effective communication among different language speakers, especially in immigrant-receiving countries in the Global North, such as Canada, has increased. On the other hand, the rising importance of English serves to strengthen its linguistic, cultural, and political hegemony over other languages, both locally and globally (Kachru,1985; Pennycook,1994; Phillipson, 1992). Also, Blommaert (2003) argues that globalization does not simply reinforce the top-down spread of English, but also suggests the presence of a local niche that accepts English as a resource to be included in the users’ repertoire.

The combination of these factors, such as migration, sociopolitical development around the world, the rise of neoliberalism, and the increasing polarization of ideologies and politics, impacts not only language policies within a national boundary, but also has influences on a global level. Thus, when L2 speakers of English immigrate to English speaking countries, they bring their attitudes and perceptions toward the dominant language of communication and the underlying ideology(ies) that have been shaped historically by the superior status of English. Also, the languages in L2 speakers’ repertoires are important constructs within their identities. It is therefore important to understand the language practices and associated ideologies of L2 speakers in order to explore their settlement as immigrants.

This article is part of broader research where I aim to explore the language learning, language practices, and settlement experiences of Bangladeshi immigrants in Canada with a focus on how their ethnolinguistic and religious identities intersect with their language learning and settlement. Bangladeshi immigrants are an underrepresented group in sociolinguistic research in North America, especially in Canada (Zaman & Habib, 2018). To understand the language learning and language practices of Bangladeshi immigrants, it is important to examine the language ideologies that dominate such learning and practices. In the social view of language, linguistic forms are markers of their users’ social identity, and therefore, represent the “broader cultural images of people and activities” (Irvine & Gal, 2000, p.37). Linguistic differences, therefore, index distinctions not only in language, but also in the values, beliefs, and practices of social groups. Thus, it is suggested that language ideologies reveal the origin and impact of linguistic differences on users’ practices and the subsequent implications for society. Woolard and Schieffelin (1994) stated that critical analysis of language ideologies is important, as they “serve as a mediating link between social structures and forms of talk” (p. 55). Therefore, studying the language ideology of a particular society reveals its dominant power structures and the manifestation of those structures in everyday communication. Language ideologies also “envision and enact links of language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality and to epistemology” (p. 56) and therefore shape individuals’ ways of being in and understanding the social world through their own language use. Consequently, I understand language ideology as how groups of people view the language(s) of different social groups and their users, including their own, and, vice versa, how language ideologies impact people’s attitudes and social relationships and reproduce power relations. This brings us to the question of the construction of ideologies and the historical and political forces that contribute. The authors cited above stress the importance not only of studying language ideology, but also of examining the forces dominant in constructing those ideologies.

Ideologies associated with language(s) are products of complex socio-historical and political processes that require close examination of the forces that shape language forms today. Woolard (1992) claimed that language ideology and “social, discursive and linguistic practices” (p. 235) have a dialectical relationship of influence with each other; this relationship also reproduces and represents the power relations and linguistic politics in a given society. As mentioned before, this article is part of a broader project on skilled immigrants from Bangladesh. A language ideology lens will help me to gain a nuanced understanding of the language practices and settlement of this inadequately researched community. In this article, I take a look back in history to examine the social, cultural, and political development that led to the creation of today’s Bangladesh as a nation-state. I also examine the forces and phenomena that have been profound influences on the culture and practices of the Bangla-speaking Bangladeshi Muslim population. Through this analysis, I aim to provide a glimpse into the historical development of the ideologies associated with certain languages in Bangladesh today and how they influence the language practices and social activities of Bangladeshis at home and abroad. I must mention here that I focus only on the Bangla-speaking Muslim population, partially because of my own ethnolinguistic and religious affiliation with this population. A focus on other religions and ethnic languages of Bangladesh is outside the scope and focus of this study. I also believe that it is necessary to study this ethnolinguistic and religious minority group of people and their settlement in North America as part of the backdrop of the rise in Islamophobia globally (Kazi, 2021; Kumar, 2012).

Historical Background

The following sections shed light on the history of the Bengal region and today’s Bangladesh from pre-colonial times, the spread of Islam, the way local people have interacted with Islam, the rise of nationalism and religious identity, and the construction and implications of language ideologies.

Present-day Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a Muslim majority country and one of the most densely populated countries in the world, home to almost 170 million people (Statista, 2021). Bangladesh is conceived to be and is projected as a monolingual country, drawing on the conceptualization of শুদ্ধ [correct] Bangla as “standard Bangla.” The Bangla language is associated with Bengali nationalism in Bangladesh. This nationalist zeal and the equating of “correct” with “standard” marginalizes the many varieties of Bangla and their speakers within Bangladesh. Needless to say, “standard” Bangla not only marginalizes other varieties of Bangla, but plays an imperialist role in marginalizing ethnolinguistic minorities. While the Bangla language is linked to Bengali nationalism, English enjoys a higher status in postcolonial Bangladesh (Hossain & Tollefson, 2007). Also, Arabic has a special position among the Muslims of Bangladesh, being the holy language of Islam, even though only a few Bangladeshis understand it. The Bangla language spoken in Bangladesh features many Perso-Arabic words (Faquire, 2010, Rahim, 1992; Uddin, 2006) due to the history dating back to the start of Islamic civilization in the subcontinent and in Bengal. While Persian vocabulary has seeped into the Bangla language for everyday activities, Arabic has a higher status among Muslims and has distinct functions in daily prayers and religious activities. These Perso-Arabic linguistic forms characterize language practices, especially the practices of the Muslim population, such as exchanging greetings in Arabic. Many Bangla-speaking Muslims also commonly intersperse Arabic words that have religious affiliations in their language. Thus, in Bangladesh, it is possible to guess a person’s religious affiliation through their language practices. This reflects the fact that religion is an important category in constructing language ideologies to understand the linguistic differences between social groups. It also shows the significance of nationhood and nationalism, as well as colonization and globalization, as relevant categories of ideological constructions within each language. According to Friedrich (1989), religion and nationhood are two important ideological constructs. These two constructs have both shaped and been shaped by the politics of the region, contributing to the constructed ideologies that dominate the beliefs and practices of social groups.

Thus, Bangla, English, and Arabic have distinct positions in Bangladesh among different social groups. Understanding the positions and ideologies associated with these languages requires a historical analysis. This is carried out in the subsequent sections.

History of the Bengal Region

To understand present-day Bangladesh, it is imperative to look into the history that has sewn the social fabric of the country. It is impossible to study the history of Bengal without considering the various empires that have ruled the region and the religions that have flourished in each empire. These various empires and religions left an indelible mark on the people of Bengal and its social, cultural, and political composition, and formed the nation as it is today. In fact, the different empires or eras in Bengal are marked by the distinct religious philosophies and cultural traditions brought by the rulers. Therefore, religion is an integral aspect of the history of Bengal, as it has influenced and shaped local life significantly.

Present-day Bangladesh is a relatively new nation-state; it marked itself as an independent country on the world map in only 1971, after gaining independence from Pakistan. However, the region, commonly documented as the Bengal region, has a long-standing history dating back thousands of years (Eaton, 1993). Bangladesh is part of the Indian subcontinent––composed of present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh––which was under British rule for almost 200 years (1757–1947). The subcontinent gained freedom from British colonial rule in 1947. It was partitioned in the same year, based on the “Two-Nation Theory” that viewed Hindus and Muslims as separate communities and led to the birth of a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan (Jalal, 1995). In 1947, Pakistan was comprised of two geographically separated regions: West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan, which was also known as East Bengal (present-day Bangladesh). West and East Pakistan were not only geographically separated, but also had ethnolinguistic and cultural differences (Uddin, 2006). The differences and turmoil between West and East Pakistan grew, resulting in the 1971 War of Liberation when East Pakistan gained independence from West Pakistan and Bangladesh was born as a nation-state.

This small snippet of history provides only a partial picture of the flux of different languages, cultures, religions, and their impact on the politics and ideological characterization of the region. It is necessary to delve into history and analyze the sociocultural and religious trajectories to understand the roles and ideologies associated with languages in the subcontinent and, more specifically, in Bangladesh, and their influences on Bangladeshi Muslims’ language practices.

The Pre-Colonial Age (before 1757)

The Ruling Dynasties

The Bengal region was divided into West Bengal, with Kolkata at its centre in present-day India, and East Bengal, which is present-day Bangladesh. Before the 8th Century (Common Era), Bengal was comprised of many local kings and their kingdoms (Islam, 2011). It was during the 8th-Century Pala dynasty, established by the Buddhists of the land, that the region came under one kingdom. The Pala dynasty ruled for a few centuries  until the rise of the Sena dynasty in the 11th century. The Sena dynasty was a Hindu dynasty; the rulers came to Bengal from Karnataka, South India. According to Islam (2011), the religious harmony that was achieved during the Buddhist Pala dynasty was disrupted by the Hindu rulers of the Sena dynasty. Thus, the Bengal region was initially under the rule of Buddhist and Hindu rulers, with the majority local population following Buddhism, Hinduism, and indigenous religions until the 12th century, when Bengal came under Muslim rule. Muslim rule was established in Bengal in 1204 when Iqtiak Uddin Muhammad Bakhtiar Kjilji, a Turkish Muslim warrior, conquered Bengal (Uddin, 2006). After that time, Bengal was led by different Muslim rulers. Islam flourished under the Muslim rulers and reached its peak when Bengal came under the dominion of the Mughal empire in the early 17th century (Uddin, 2006). The Mughals continued to rule Bengal, and indeed the entire Indian subcontinent, until the rise of British colonial power. It is important to mention here that the Muslim rulers of Bengal were of foreign descent, including Arabs, Turks, Abyssinians, and Afghans (Uddin, 2006). The inter-religious harmonious nature of Bengal that was disrupted by the Sena dynasty was restored during the Muslim empire (Dasgupta, 2004; Islam, 2011). This short historical overview chronicles the different ruling periods in Bengal and explains how deeply religion is entrenched in the sociopolitical developments of Bengal and in the lives of its people.

The Spread of Islam

Islam came to India and to Bengal through foreign Muslim conquerors. Today, after the Arabs, Bengali Muslims are the third largest ethnic population of Islamic faith in the world (Eaton, 1993). Though the ruling power remained in the hands of the foreign-descended Muslims, the religion spread widely in rural areas among the locals in Eastern Bengal (Bangladesh). Eaton (1993) claims that this wide spread of Islam among working-class people in the rural areas in Eastern/East Bengal deserves careful study, as such an extensive spread of Islam is not seen in other parts of India, including West Bengal. There are a number of theories, such as migration theory and “religion of the sword theory” (Uddin, 2006), that have attempted to explain this spread of Islam in Bangladesh, but they either fall short of evidence, or they do not adequately explain the phenomenon. Eaton (1993) argues that Islam did not rise in Bengal because of the ruling class Muslims, but was spread by the Sufis, who played an instrumental role in spreading Islam to remote areas in East Bengal—a low-lying land with huge bodies of water and dense forests considered almost uninhabitable. The early Sufis were of foreign descent too; however, they managed to connect with the local working-class. The ruling Muslim class of foreign descent consisted of administrators, traders, leaders, and orthodox believers. They pursued a Perso-Islamic lifestyle, and developed Persian and Arabic literature (Dasgupta, 2004). They were the Ashrafs—the aristocratic Persian and/or Arabic speaking Muslim class in Bengal—whereas the local Bangla-speaking population who converted to Islam were considered the Atrafs, who consisted mostly of the rural peasant and artisan classes (Sharif, 1987; Uddin, 2006). Thus, there was a very clear distinction between the Ashrafs and Atrafs, depending on their ethnicity, language, class, and lifestyle in Bengal (Uddin, 2006). Though the Ashrafs considered their culture superior to that of the locals in Bengal, they also assimilated with the local culture, which then resulted in the intermingling of Perso-Arabic culture with Bengali indigenous culture (Uddin, 2006 ). Also, there was intermarriage between the two classes. The later Ashrafs, being born on Bengal soil, could not continue to distinguish themselves from the locals (Uddin, 2006).

Though the increasing conversion accelerated the growth of the Muslim population, it did not come into conflict with the existing religious beliefs in the region. In fact, a syncretic cultural motif was developed with the coexistence of different religions and practices. The converted local rural Muslims’ practices were markedly different from those of the Urban Ashraf Muslims. The Ashrafs’ practices involved Arabic and Middle Eastern norms. The Atrafs incorporated their local norms and practices into their newly found belief. Thus, they practiced an indigenized Islam independent from Perso-Arabic influence and different from what was followed in the northern parts of the subcontinent (Sharif, 1987). This tradition later became a source of criticism on the legitimacy of the Muslimness of the Bengali Muslims (Uddin, 2006). This history marks the beginning of a gap between the different social groups in Bengal, as well as a potential divergence from Middle Eastern religious practices, and establishes an indigenized Islam practised by the people of Bengal.

In pre-colonial India, including Bengal, Persian was the language of the court and the elite during Muslim rule. In the pre-Muslim era, Sanskrit was the high-status language used in literature and at court. Bangla was never considered a legitimate language by the elite class and was spoken mostly by working-class people, which can be taken as an indication of the position and status of Bangla and its speakers in the society.

British Colonial Era (1757–1947)

The impact of colonial rule on the sociocultural and political history of the subcontinent is vast. Languages and religions were not exempt from the politics of the colonial powers. The British viewed Hindus and Muslims as “two separate communities with distinct political interests” (Uddin, 2006, p. 48). Consequently, different strategies were developed by the colonizers to interact with and govern the people of these two faiths. Christian missionaries also had different strategies for Hindus and Muslims to convert them to Christianity, which was presented to the locals as equivalent to modernization in India (Uddin, 2006, pp. 47-49). The missionaries spread Christianity; the initial negative responses by the local Hindus and Muslims to the conversion invitation soon turned into “internal communal debate” (Uddin, 2006, p. 49). This division between Hindus and Muslims was one of the deciding factors leading to partition and the formation of India and Pakistan as nation states. Since then, religion has been a determining force in subcontinental politics.

In 1837, English replaced Persian as the language of the court in British India. Colonial rulers used local languages for government administration purposes (Pennycook, 1994). Thus, Urdu—written in Perso-Arabic script, which derives its vocabulary predominantly from Arabic and Persian—became the language of governance in most regions in Northern India. Though Urdu was spoken by both Muslims and non-Muslims of those regions, the language gradually became associated with Muslims specifically, taking on a “cultural symbol” status for the formation of Muslim identity during the period of British rule in the subcontinent (Uddin, 2006, p. 59). Due to this iconization (Irvine & Gal, 2000) of Urdu, Muslims started identifying with it, while Hindus began to identify with the Hindi language, which is written in Devanagari script and derives its vocabulary from Sanskrit. Along the same vein, Bangla was seen as a language of the Hindu community due to its subcontinental roots. This construction of Urdu as an Islamic language for the Muslims in the subcontinent further marginalized the Bangla speaking uneducated Muslims in rural Eastern Bengal, the majority of whom belonged to the working class (Kabir, 1987; Rahim, 1992). Though Bengali Muslims considered Urdu an Islamic language, their day-to-day spoken language was Bangla. This disassociation from Urdu alienated Bengali Muslims from the subcontinental Muslim community (Uddin, 2006, pp. 108–109). Meanwhile, English became the dominant language for education and work opportunities under British rule, a legacy that has become even stronger in today’s globalized context.

Tension between Hindu and Muslim communities in Bengal was fueled during British rule, and both communities took part in the struggle for independence to realize their dreams of separate lands for Hindu and Muslim communities. Thus, colonial rule ended in 1947 and, out of the Two-Nation Theory, India and Pakistan were born.

In this section, I have portrayed the colonial rules and politics and the sociopolitical and linguistic situation of the subcontinent before 1947. The next section elaborates on the region’s history after the 1947 Partition.

The Post-Partition Pakistan Era (1947–1971)

Though Pakistan was born out of the concept of “one religion, one country,” tension soon erupted between Urdu-speaking West Pakistan and Bangla-speaking East Pakistan (previously, East Bengal). It was religion that united the West and East Pakistanis; however, it was language that led to their division. West Pakistan was the capital of undivided Pakistan. The West Pakistani rulers wanted Urdu to be the state language of newly formed Pakistan, as Urdu was the cultural symbol of the Muslims of the subcontinent. Bengali Muslims naturally objected to the proposal; Bangla language speakers were far more numerous in East Pakistan than their Urdu speaking counterparts. In addition, Urdu was regarded by Bengali Muslims as the language of the elite, whereas Bangla was the language of the working-class Bengali Muslims. Also, there were people from other faiths, and Bengal has had a tradition of cultural diversity, tolerance, and brotherhood (Islam, 2018, p.20). The then-East Pakistan therefore proposed to have both Urdu and Bangla as state languages, a proposal which was turned down vehemently by the then-West Pakistani rulers (Alam, 2007). There was even an attempt to “de-Sanskritize” Bangla and “Arabicize” it, as Sanskrit was identified as the language of the Hindu community, and thus, Bangla—being derived from Prakrit (an ancient subcontinental language dating back to the Sanskrit era) and written in a script derived from Devanagari, which was used to write Sanskrit and Hindi—was seen as a Hindu language (Uddin, 2006. pp.108-125). As a result, the Muslims of East Bengal (present-day Bangladesh) were perceived as being less Muslim than their non-Bengali counterparts, because they spoke Bangla. After the 1947 Partition, the western wing of newly-formed Pakistan was rife with the perception that the Bengali ethnicity and Bangla-speaking Muslims in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) were different from their non-Bengali Muslim West Pakistan countrymen (Uddin, 2006, pp. 124-125). The complex political history of the subcontinent, already divided on the surface issue of religion, and the subsequent division of West and East Pakistan had the effect of politicizing the languages and religions of the region. After that time, linguistic differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities in Bangladesh began to  index their different social identities. Religion, thus, became a politicized category for constructing ideological characterizations of language forms, to differentiate between the language practices of the different communities.

East Pakistanis (Bengalis) protested the cultural and linguistic aggression of West Pakistan and the “purgation” of the Bangla language. The proposal to have both Urdu and Bangla as state languages was turned down by West Pakistani rulers. On February 21st, 1952, police fired on a student-organized procession in Dhaka. This event marked the foundation of Bangla nationalism, indicated a distinct Bengali identity, and eventually led to the War of Liberation of 1971 (Azim, 2002; Uddin, 2006, pp.125–126). During the Pakistani era, due to unresolved state language issues, English remained the language of communication between East and West Pakistan, and thus, colonialism’s legacy was carried forward. The War of Liberation  was an important historical event, not only because it laid the foundation for the liberation of Bangladesh, but also because it invoked nationalism based on language as an ideological construction of Bangladeshi/Bengali identity. In this struggle for Bengali identity based on the Bangla language, Bangla, in Bourdieu’s (1991) words, becomes an “object of mental representation” (p. 220) that created a category to imagine, perceive, and recognize Bangla speakers as a distinct community within a separate territory, thereby conceptualizing a nation as a geographical boundary within which people speak one language. Thus, the ideology of nationalism became associated with the Bangla language within an imagined nation state.

Religious perception and segregation, ethnic and linguistic differences, and economic and cultural exploitation by West Pakistan led to separation from Pakistan and gave birth to Bangladesh as an independent nation-state in 1971 (Islam, 2018). This struggle for independence also meant that East Bengal, for the first time in many centuries, regained sovereignty and the right to self-governance. The foundational stone of this newly liberated land was laid by Bengali ethnicity and Bangla nationalism, rooted in the Bangla language (Hossain & Tollefson, 2007; Sultana, 2014). This review of history suggests how religion has been politicized during the British and Pakistani colonial eras and how religion and nationalism as ideological constructs have become intertwined with the languages of the subcontinent.

A review of these historical events established the purpose and significance of using a language ideology framework to understand immigrants’ language practices in the diaspora. Since sociopolitical and historical developments in the Bengal region, intertwined with language and religion, have had such a profound impact on the lives of the people, it is important to review and understand these developments in order to explore Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants’ attitudes and perceptions towards languages in a very different context, where they belong to minority communities.

People’s Republic of Bangladesh (1971–present): Balancing Religion and Secularism in the Construction of the Nation

Bangladesh, as a separate nation state, was recognized on December 16th, 1971 after a nine-month war with former West Pakistan. The ideological structure and characterization of the new nation drew from Bengali ethnicity and the Bangla language, while maintaining a secular stance as one of the founding principles of Bangladesh. It is important to mention here that secularism in Bangladesh is conceived as being inclusive of all religions, contrary to the Western conceptualization of secularism that attempts to exclude religion from public life (Brubaker, 2013). Bangla became the state language of independent Bangladesh. The Bangla-centered ethnic and linguistic ideology of Bangladesh lent it a monolingual character (Sultana, 2014), and excluded the ethnic minorities of Bangladesh who are not Bengali, do not speak Bangla, and are mostly followers of indigenous faiths. Also, there are many varieties of Bangla spoken in different regions of the country. The standard variety is that spoken by the urban educated middle-class in Dhaka, the capital; it is also the official language, which marginalizes regional vernaculars. A study by Hasan and Rahman (2014) on the standard Bangla language ideology demonstrates the higher status of standard Bangla over the regional varieties.

Over the years, Bangladeshi nationalism has evolved, balancing between secularism and the religiosity crafted by political leaders. Through changes in power and government, the secular identity of Bangladesh that was a founding principle during the war of independence has been lost, and a Muslim national identity has gained prominence. The rise of the Muslim nationalistic identity can be attributed to the country’s political turmoil and the increasing influence of globalization that opened doors for an Arab- and Middle-East-oriented Islam in Bangladesh. Thus, the struggle between religion and culture in Bangladesh remains an inconclusive one that has been a source of “confusing tensions and uneasy stalemate between Muslim nationalistic Bangladeshi identity and the more secular, religiously and culturally pluralist Bengali identity” (Islam, 2018, p. 20). The urban, western-educated secular intellectuals failed to understand the religious sentiment of the majority by disassociating Islam from Bengali identity in their dominant discourses, which has further polarized the issues around language, ethnicity, and religion in the nation-building discourse of Bangladesh. This has perpetuated the confusion that Islam (2018) aptly captured in the above quote. These political and sociocultural developments contributed to language ideologies that impact the language practices of the different social groups in Bangladesh.

Attitudes and Perceptions Toward Languages

The various contesting factors in the history of the subcontinent and of Bangladesh moulded attitudes and perceptions toward the different languages that are used in this region. I now discuss the languages that have a dominant impact on the identity and practices of Bangladeshi people, especially the Muslim population.

English enjoys a position of status and power in postcolonial Bangladesh, even though the country seems to lack a clear language policy. Though English is used extensively in education and the private sector in Bangladesh, there is no explicit policy about the status of English, and it does not have official status (Hamid, 2011; Hossain & Tollefson, 2007; Rahman & Pandian, 2017). However, the attitude towards learning the English language is very positive in Bangladesh, irrespective of people’s socio-economic backgrounds (Alam, 2017; Erling, et al, 2013; Erling et al, 2012) and is not viewed as a burden from the legacy of colonial rule (Hossain & Tollefson, 2007). English is seen as a vehicle of development by the majority in Bangladesh. It is also seen as the language that symbolizes modernity, progress, and membership in the elite class. English is still a language of the local elites in postcolonial Bangladesh. It acts as a gatekeeper and is responsible for social stratification (Choudhury, 2008; Hossain & Tollefson, 2007; Imam, 2005). English is important for education in Bangladesh, to the extent that the schooling system is divided into three categories: English-medium, Bangla-medium, and Madrasa (Quranic) education, depending on the amount and quality of English taught in these schools. It should come as no surprise that the English spoken by the elite members of society is considered the most powerful and ‘correct’ version of the language. This creates an ideology that dominates people’s attitudes and beliefs, not only toward English but also toward Bangla, and that shapes their social lives.

Though the Bangla language is the foundation stone of Bengali nationalism and symbolizes Bengali culture, it holds a somewhat lower status than English. Due to the elite status of English in Bangladesh, English contributes to social inequality and furthers the gap between different social classes, marginalizing and disempowering Bangla and creating a ‘vernacular divide’ (Ramanathan, 2005). In fact, in recent years the use of English in Bangladesh, especially in the media, has grown to such an extent that the High Court had to provide a verdict to maintain the official language status of Bangla in Bangladesh and to reduce unnecessary use of English (HC rules on use of Bangla everywhere, 2014). Remember the standard Dhaka variety of Bangla is considered the official language. This standard Bangla dominates the practices of urban educated Bengalis and pushes the other regional varieties to the margin. Thus, even within the Bangla language and its use, there are social structures involved that encourage and perpetuate a specific Bangla over the other varieties and that contribute to the construction of ‘standard’ language ideology (Green, 1997). This totalizing character development of Bangla ignores the other varieties and removes them from standard language discourse, a process that Irvine and Gal (2000) named as erasure.

A distinctive feature of Bangla in Bangladesh is the presence and use of many Arabic and Persian words. This also reflects the historical and cultural composition of the population and acts as a marker of Bangladeshi Bangla-speaking Muslims identity. Arabic is considered a sacred language in Bangladesh, being the language of the holy Quran and the preferred language of Islam. Most Bangladeshi Muslims are taught to read the Quran in Arabic. However, the majority learn to read the Quran without understanding the language. Yet, respect toward the language is intact, as it is considered the language of Islam. Bengali Muslims recite Arabic verses from the Quran in their prayers and many Arabic words/phrases related to religion are commonly used by Muslims in Bangladesh in their speech. The Arabic language is important in the Madrasa education stream in Bangladesh.

Bangla, English and Arabic each have their distinct place in Bangladeshi people’s lives. While Bangla is the language of Bengali nationalism, English is equated with modernity and progress, and Arabic is important for the religious affiliation of Muslims. The accelerating pace of globalization has furthered the value of English in Bangladesh, where it has been treated as a language of power for centuries. This historical analysis reveals the background of the sociocultural, linguistic, religious, and political struggle and development in the Bengal region and today’s Bangladesh, and the forces that contributed to the construction of ideologies associated with the languages. The languages and their practices act as identity markers of the social groups, their social positions, and activities.

Language Ideology and the Bangladeshi Diasporic Community

This historical overview is necessary to understand the dominant ideological constructs that flourished in the region called Bangladesh today, as well as their affiliation with, and representations in, languages and society. As mentioned before, this article is part of a critical sociolinguistic research project where I aim to explore the language learning, language practices and settlement of Bangladeshi Bangla-speaking Muslim immigrants in Canada. Immigrants’ lived experience in Bangladesh is shaped by the dominant ideologies that are reflected through the languages. These ideologies influence their attitudes and perceptions toward languages, even after immigration. In fact, it becomes more important after immigration, as languages act as identity markers for social groups, and identity issues come to the forefront when people are away from their homeland. Language ideologies, therefore, can explain the impact of conceived differences between languages, language forms, language practices, and the social activities of their speakers. As Woolard (1992, p.137) stated, “ideology calls attention to socially situated and/or experientially driven dimensions of cognition or consciousness” and languages are vehicles through which ideologies are practised and sustained. Irvine and Gal (2000) claimed that people’s language ideologies “locate linguistic phenomena as part of, and evidence for, what they believe to be systematic behavioral, aesthetic, affective, and moral contrasts among the social groups indexed” (p. 37), suggesting that language ideologies are important constructs in shaping people’s beliefs, attitudes, and relationships with their languages, the languages of other social groups, and their language practices.

Analyzing language ideologies and people’s practices is important for my broader research questions. It is necessary to understand how Bangladeshi immigrants view the dominant languages in Canada and how their perceptions influence their language learning, settlement, and relationships within the Bangladeshi community and other communities. Canada promotes multiculturalism within a bilingual framework (Haque, 2012) and recognizes English and French as the official languages of the country, contributing to the dominant language ideologies and colonial legacies in the process. Bangladeshi immigrants, being postcolonial subjects and coming from a hierarchical society where English plays a role in social inequality, have experienced English as part of the colonial legacy in their own country. Globalization has further solidified the importance of English(es) worldwide. It is worth investigating how carrying this complex ideology associated with the English language in an English-speaking country shapes the social activities and relations of Bangladeshi immigrants. Han (2007, 2011, 2014, 2019) argues that language ideology needs to be conceptualized and examined when exploring immigrants and their social relations, language learning, and practices. She further claims that the notion of standard language ideology is paramount in L2 teaching, where learners are supposed to acquire a “native-like” proficiency. This native-like proficiency concept perpetuates the standard language ideology, where it is shown that there is a particular way of speaking English that must be attained by learners, and, therefore, places the speaker of that specific variety on the upper end of the hierarchy. This concept is found in Bangladesh as well, where English is the language of the elite. Thus, this elitist view of English, reinforced through a standard language ideology, shapes the social relations of the learners with the host society where English is the dominant language. Since language learning is a socially situated activity shaped by participation in social activities, access to participation is important. This raises questions about which language and language speakers are seen as native speakers of English, who has greater access to social networks, how they are viewed by other social groups, and how the concept of standard impacts social structures and relations. These questions bring us back to ideological queries; therefore, understanding language ideology and the forces that create it will shed light on Bangladeshi immigrants’ language practices, and social and power relations. I argue that adopting language ideology as a critical lens will enable a much-needed analysis of the attitudes and perceptions pervasive among Bangladeshi immigrants and in Canadian society when it comes to languages.

It is also important to understand how a loss of linguistic capital, along with other forms of social capital, shapes immigrants’ lives. The majority of Bangladeshi immigrants speak English as an additional language. French has no official status in Bangladesh, nor is it part of the education system, suggesting that not many Bangladeshis have skills in French. Bangla has little functional value in Canada outside the home or the Bengali community. Thus, the attitudes and feelings that Bangladeshis harbour toward the Bangla language, and how Bangla is perceived by other communities, impact the social activities and language practices of Bangladeshi immigrants.

Lastly, Bengali Muslims are likely to maintain their Arabic knowledge, as Ferguson (1982) observed that religion is key in maintaining language knowledge after immigration. The limited knowledge of Arabic among Bangla-speaking Bangladeshi Muslims, and their ideology toward the language, may have further implications for their social practices and relationships with other community members in Canada, given the political and historical characterization of the country.

Conclusion

My aim in writing this article was to explore the various forces that created the language ideologies within the historical, sociocultural, and political structures of the region named Bangladesh. Examining the construction of dominant language ideologies in Bangladesh and in Canada is necessary to understand Bangla-speaking Muslim Bangladeshi immigrants in Canada, their language practices, and the impact on their settlement. Reviewing the history of the land called Bangladesh and its ideological characterization, or lack thereof, prompted me to analyze the historical events that shaped the ideological constructs of the land and how the ideologies have become implicit in the languages and the people’s activities. Language ideologies index the social identity of different groups and explain how power relations are reproduced through language. They also explore our underlying beliefs and perceptions, not just about languages but also about their speakers. As Bucholtz (2001) argues, language ideologies include not just language, but also other identity constructs, such as race and class. Bangladeshi skilled immigrants, an ethnolinguistic and religious minority group in Canada, even after proving their English language skills in the immigration process, struggle to navigate Canadian society. Lack of language proficiency has been identified as one of the core reasons by the people themselves. I understand language learning as a social process that can be achieved through socialization, rather than as a classroom-based phenomenon. I argue, therefore, that it is essential to explore the language ideologies dominant among Bangladeshi immigrants and in Canadian society to examine the settlement trajectory of this group of immigrants. It will help us to understand skilled Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants’ language learning and language practices, how they view Canadian society and its dominant languages, how they are viewed and positioned in the society and why, and how they navigate their settlement journey in Canada.

References

Adamuti-Trache, M. (2012). Language Acquisition Among Adult Immigrants in Canada: The Effect of Premigration Language Capital. Adult Education Quarterly, 63(2), 103–126. DOI: IO.I 177/0741713612442804

Agarwal, S. K. (2013). Economic disparities among South Asian immigrants in Canada. South Asian Diaspora, 5(1), 7–34. DOI: 10.1080/19438192.2013.720514

Alam, M. S. (2017). Bangladeshi College Students’ Attitude Towards English Language Learning. British Journal of English Linguistics, 5(4), 29–40.

Alam, S. M. S. (2007). Language as political articulation: East Bengal in 1952. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 21(4), 469–487. DOI: 10.1080/00472339180000311

Ali, H. M. M., & Alam, T. N. (2015). Cultural approximation, alienation and the role of English as a second language in Canadian society. Arab World English Journal, 6(3), 275–292.

Azim, F. (2002). Language, identity, and culture. In F. Alam & F. Azim (Eds.), Politics and culture: Essays in honour of Shirajul Islam Choudhury (pp. 351–364). University of Dhaka

Bengali Information and Employment Services (BIES). (2013). A study on the status of Bangladeshi new immigrants in Ontario: Employment perspectives. BIES.

Blommaert, J. (2003). Commentary: A Sociolinguistics of Globalization. Journal of Sociolinguistics, 7(4), 607–623.

Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power (G. Raymond. M. Adamson, Trans.). Harvard University Press.

Boyd, M. (1990). Immigrant women: Language, socioeconomic inequalities, and policy issues. In S. Halli, F. Trovato, & L. Driedger (Eds.), Ethnic demography—Canadian immigrant: Racial and cultural variations (pp. 275–295). Carleton University Press.

Boyd, M. & Cao, X. (2009). Immigrant Language proficiency, earnings and policies. Canadian Studies in Population, 36(1–2), 63–86.

Brubaker, R. (2013). Language, religion and the politics of difference. Nations and Nationalism, 19(1), 1–20.

Bucholtz, M. (2001). The Whiteness of Nerds: Superstandard English and Racial Markedness. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 11(1), 84–100.

Chiswick, B. & Miller, P. (1988). Earnings in Canada: The roles of immigrant generation, French ethnicity and language. Research in Population Economics, 6, 183–224.

Choudhury, R. (2008). Examining Language Learning from a Critical Perspective. Teachers College, Columbia University. Working papers in TESOL & Applied Linguistics, 8(1), 1–3.

Dasgupta, A. (2004). Islam in Bengal: Formative period. Social Scientist, 32(3/4), 30–41.

Derwing, M.T. & Waugh, E. (2012). Language Skills and the Social Integration of Canada’s Adult Immigrants. Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) Study. Montreal, Canada.

Eaton, R.M. (1993). The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760. University of California Press.

Erling, E.J., Hamid, M.O., & Seargeant, P. (2013). Grassroots attitudes to English as a language for international development in Bangladesh. In E.J. Erling & P. Seargeant (Eds.), English and Development: Policy, Pedagogy and Globalization (pp. 88–101). Multilingual Matters.

Erling, E.J., Seargeant, P., Solly, M., Chowdhury, Q.H., & Rahman, S. (2012). Attitudes to English as a language for international development in rural Bangladesh. ELT Research Papers, 12(8), 3–22. British Council. Retrieved from https://www.teachingenglish.org.uk/article/attitudes-english-a-language-international-development-rural-bangladesh

Faquire, A. B. M. R. K. (2010). Language Situation in Bangladesh. The Dhaka University Studies, 67(2), 63–77.

Ferguson, C. A. (1982). Religious factors in language spread. In R. L. Cooper (Ed.), Language spread: Studies in diffusion and social change (pp. 95–106). Indiana University Press.

Friedrich, P. (1989). Language, Ideology and Political Economy. American Anthropologist, 91(2), 295–312.

Ghosh, S. (2014). A Passage to Canada: The Differential Migrations of South Asian Skilled Workers to Toronto. International Migration & Integration, 15, 715–735. DOI 10.1007/s12134-013-0298-0

Giampapa, F. & Canagarajah, S. (2017). Skilled migration and global English. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 15(1), 1–4, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2017.1296658

Hamid, M.O. (2011). Globalisation, English for everyone and English teacher capacity: language policy discourses and realities in Bangladesh. Current Issues in Language Planning, 11(4), 289–310, DOI: 10.1080/14664208.2011.532621

Han, H (2007). Language, Religion and Immigrant Settlement: An Ethnography [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. OISE, University of Toronto, Toronto.

Han, H. (2011). Social inclusion through multilingual ideologies, policies and practices: A case study of a minority church. International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 14(4), 383–398, DOI: 10.1080/13670050.2011.573063

Han, H. (2014). “Westerners,” “Chinese”, and/or “us”: Exploring the intersection of language, race, religion and immigrantization. Anthropology and Education Quarterly45(1), 54–70.

Han, H. (2019) Making “second generation,” inflicting linguistic injuries: An ethnography of a mainland Chinese church in Canada. Journal of Language, Identity & Education, 18(1), 55–69, DOI: 10.1080/15348458.2019.1569524

Haque, E. (2012). Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework: Language, race and belonging in Canada. University of Toronto Press.

Hasan, S. M. & Rahman, A. (2004). Standard dialect ideology in Bangladesh: A field study. Language in India, 14(10), 184–197.

Heath, S. B. (1989). Language ideology. International Encyclopedia of Communications (Vol. 2), pp. 393–395, Oxford University Press.

Hossain, T. & Tollefson, J. W. (2007). Language Policy in Education in Bangladesh. In A.B.M. Tsui & J.W. Tollefson (Eds). Language Policy, Culture, and Identity in Asian Contexts (pp.241–257). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Imam, S. R. (2005). English as a Global Language and the Question of Nation Building in Bangladesh. Comparative Education, 41(4), 471–486.

Irvine, J. T. & Gal, S. (2000). Language ideology and linguistic differentiation. In P. V. Kroskrity (Ed.), Regimes of language (pp. 35–83). School of American Research Press.

Islam, K. I. (2011). Historical Overview of Religious Pluralism in Bengal. Bangladesh e-journal of Sociology, 8(1), 26–33. https://bangladeshsociology.org/BEJS%208.1%20Final.pdf

Islam, M. M. (2018). Secularism in Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution. South Asia Research. 38 (1), 20-39. DOI: 10.1177/0262728017745383

Jalal, A. (1995). Conjuring Pakistan: History as official imagining. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27(1), 73–89.

Kabir, M. G. (1987). Religion, Language and Nationalism in Bangladesh. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 17(4), 473–487.

Kachru. B. (1985). Standards, codification and sociolinguistic realism: The English language in the outer circle. In R. Quirk & H. G. Widdowson. (Eds). English in the World: Teaching and Learning the Language and the Literature. (pp.11–30). Cambridge University Press.

Kazi, N . (2021). Islamophobia, Race, and Global Politics. Rowman & Littlefield.

Kroskrity, P. V., Schieffelin, B. B., & Woolard, K. A. (1992) (Eds.). Special Issue on Language Ideologies. Pragmatics, 2(3), 235–453.

Kumar, D. (2012). Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire. Haymarket Books.

Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge University Press.

Pennycook, A. (1994). The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language. Longman.

Phillipson, R. (1992). Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford University Press.

Rahim, A. (1992). The political economy of English education in Muslim Bengal: 1871–1912. Comparative Education Review, 36(3), 309–321.

Rahman, M. M. & Pandian, A. (2018). The chaotic English language policy and planning in Bangladesh: Areas of apprehension. Social Sciences and Humanities, 26(2), 893–908.

Ramanathan, V. (2005). The English-Vernacular Divide. Postcolonial Language Politics and Practice. Multilingual Matters

Sharif, A. (1987). বাঙালির চিন্ চেতনার বিবর্তনধারা [The evolution of the thoughts and consciousness of Bengalis]. The University Press Limited.

Statista (2021, April 21). Bangladesh: Total Population from 2016 to 2026. https://www.statista.com/statistics/438167/total-population-of-bangladesh/

Sultana, S. (2014). Heteroglossia and identities of young adults in Bangladesh. Linguistics and Education, 26, 40–56.

HC rules on use of Bangla everywhere (2014, February 17). Dhaka Tribune, P51.

https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2014/02/17/hc-rules-on-use-of-bangla-everywhere

Uddin, S. M. (2006). Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an Islamic Nation. University of North Carolina Press.

Victoria, M. P. (2017). English: its role as the language of comity in an employment programme for Canadian immigrants. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 15(1), 114–134, DOI: 10.1080/14767724.2014.937401

Woolard, K.A. (1992). Language Ideology: Issues and Approaches. Special Issues on Language Ideologies. Pragmatics, 2(3), 235–249.

Woolard, K. A., & Schieffelin, B. B. (1994). Language ideology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 23(1), 55–82

Zaman, H. & Habib, S. (2018). Introduction: Canada 150 Conference on Migration of Bengalis. Proceedings of Canada 150 Migration of Bengalis. http://monographs.lib.sfu.ca/index.php/sfulibrary/catalog/book/73

“First they Americanize you and then they throw you out”: A LangCrit Analysis of Language and Citizen Identity

MARINKA SWIFT, University of California, Davis

ABSTRACT.

While the United States (U.S.) has the second-largest Spanish-speaking population in the world, second only to Mexico, an essentialized ideology persists of what it sounds like to be an American citizen, which impacts some speakers in distinctive ways. Generation 1.5 adults who have been repatriated to Mexico are uniquely impacted by this language ideology and the power structures that sustain it. The present study analyzes digital stories of deportation as spaces through which generation 1.5 adults perform citizen identity. Data for the present study is drawn from digital testimonies and are part of a larger archive of the Humanizing Deportation project. Guided by Critical Language and Race Theory (Crump, 2014b), this study aims to better understand the interaction between language and citizen identity for generation 1.5 adults. While scholarship around language and social identity has received much attention across a range of disciplines over the past few decades, little research has investigated the linguistic and citizen identities of adults repatriated to Mexico by the United States. I offer an analysis of the role of language in citizen identities and the implications of these findings for future research and activism.

RÉSUMÉ.

Tandis que les États-Unis comptent la deuxième plus grande population hispanophone au monde, tout juste après le Mexique, une idéologie simpliste persiste quant à ce que cela laisse entendre d’être un citoyen américain, ce qui influence les locuteurs de différentes façons. Les adultes de la génération 1,5 ayant été rapatriés au Mexique sont particulièrement affectés par cette idéologie langagière et les structures de pouvoir qui la maintiennent. La présente étude analyse des histoires numériques de déportation comme moyens à travers lesquels des adultes de la génération 1,5 se forgent une identité citoyenne. Les données de la présente recherche sont tirées de témoignages numériques et prennent part à des archives plus vastes du projet Humaniser la déportation. Guidée par la théorie critique sur la langue et la race (Critical Language and Race Theory; Crump, 2014b), cette recherche vise à mieux comprendre les interactions entre la langue et l’identité citoyenne chez les adultes de la génération 1,5. Alors que l’érudition quant aux langues et à l’identité sociale a retenu l’attention de diverses disciplines dans les dernières décennies, peu de recherches se sont intéressées à l’identité linguistique et citoyenne d’adultes rapatriés au Mexique par les États-Unis. Une analyse est offerte sur le rôle de la langue dans l’identité citoyenne ainsi que sur les implications de ces conclusions pour les recherches futures et l’activisme.

Keywords: language, migration, identity, LangCrit.

INTRODUCTION

While the United States (U.S.) boasts the second-largest Spanish-speaking population in the world, second only to Mexico (Burgen, 2015; Spanish Language Domains, 2014), an essentialized ideology persists of what it sounds like to be an American citizen, which impacts some speakers in distinctive ways. Generation 1.5 adults who have been repatriated to Mexico are uniquely impacted by this language ideology and the power structures that sustain it (such as educational agencies and governing bodies). The term ‘generation 1.5’ refers to individuals that immigrate to a new country before or during their teenage years. The label ‘1.5’ refers to the fact that often such individuals bring with them characteristics of their country of origin, though they also assimilate and adopt characteristics of their new country. Some of the authors we meet in the present study were, in fact, lawful permanent residents at the time of their removal from the U.S., while others were undocumented. The present study analyzes digital stories of deportation as spaces through which generation 1.5 adults perform citizen identity. Guided by Critical Language and Race Theory (Crump, 2014b), this study aims to better understand the interaction between language and citizen identity for generation 1.5 adults. While scholarship around language and social identity has received much attention across a range of disciplines over the past few decades, little (if any) research has investigated the linguistic and citizen identities of adults repatriated to Mexico by the United States. In the following sections, I will provide a brief history of forced repatriation, an explanation of the theoretical framework guiding the present analysis, and a summary of pertinent previous research on issues relating to language, identity, and translanguaging. I then offer an analysis of the role of language in citizen identities and the implications of these findings for future research and activism. Throughout the paper, I refer to the speakers as narrators, authors, and forced-returnees.

How do individuals talk about language in digital stories of deportation? How do speakers identify themselves and their sense of belonging? The present study contributes to scholarship at the intersection of language, identity, race, and citizenship. The analysis shows how essentialized notions of language, as linked to national and citizen identities, impact the linguistic identities of forced-returnee adults both before and after deportation. The present study contributes to scholarship around language and forced migration through a critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1993) of five digital narratives archived as part of the Humanizando la Deportación digital storytelling project (see http://humanizandoladeportacion.ucdavis.edu/en/). The study urges social scientists to further investigate how language contributes to experiences of generation 1.5 adults. Such an understanding is necessary to best support the social and linguistic identities, as well as the linguistic needs of generation 1.5 adults after repatriation. Through such inquiry we can contribute to existing scholarship that acknowledges and challenges essentializing notions of language and national identity, and bring attention to the perceptions and experiences of racialized speakers. There is little research, if any, which addresses the linguistic practices, identities, and experiences of adults deported from the U.S. The present study aims to reduce this gap.

Recent History of Forced Repatriation

According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI, 2015; 2016), of the 207,000 Mexicans repatriated by the United States in 2015, “fifteen percent (29,000) had six years or more of U.S. residence before being deported” (p. 5). It is not clear exactly how many generation 1.5 (gen1.5) adults have been repatriated, nor how many gen1.5 adults reside in the United States. While one estimate claims that about half a million gen1.5s have been repatriated to Mexico over the past decade (Lakhani & Jacobo, 2016), this figure cannot be confirmed with any source. While these figures may bring us closer to a countable representation of gen1.5 forced-returnees, it is evident that additional measures are needed in order to gain clarity about the extent to which repatriation impacts generation 1.5 individuals repatriated to Mexico from the United States.

Another facet of repatriation that complicates our understanding of the situation are the legal categories that determine the deportability of an individual, which are complicated and often not known or understood by gen1.5 individuals who arrive in the U.S. as minors. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is not an aggregated explanation for the reasons leading to the forced repatriation of gen1.5 returnees. Some gen1.5 individuals are Lawful Permanent Residents at the time of their removal from the U.S., a distinct categorization that is not the same as legal citizen status and is often unclear to gen1.5 individuals. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2018), “Lawful permanent residents (LPRs) are foreign nationals who have been granted the right to reside permanently in the United States.” LPRs are often referred to simply as “immigrants”, but they are also known as “permanent resident aliens” and “green card holders” (Department of Homeland Security, 2018). While LPRs may live and work in the U.S., in order to become legal U.S.citizens they must meet additional eligibility requirements and apply for naturalization. LPRs are eligible for deportation under a variety of circumstances. One way that an individual with LPR status can be eligible for deportation is by committing a “Crime of Moral Turpitude” (CMT), which is only broadly defined by U.S. immigration law. Various offenses may be considered a CMT, ranging from misdemeanors to felonies. In some cases, no actual court conviction needs to be made for an offense to be considered a CMT (Bray, 2019; 8 USC;1227).

The language of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act is broad enough to allow states and local law enforcement agencies to independently interpret the type of infraction that would qualify an LPR for deportation. In this way, even individuals who have lawfully entered the U.S. and have valid legal documentation (such as a “green card” or LPR status) are still eligible for forced-repatriation. In many cases, gen1.5 individuals do not have LPR status and are entirely unaware that their parents (if they immigrated with their parents) did not apply for such legal status on their behalf. For these individuals, learning that they are in fact not legal U.S. citizens and are deportable is shocking news, to say the least.

It should be understood that, while I mention some legal violations that can result in forced repatriation, I am in no way suggesting that gen1.5 returnees have been repatriated as a result of a CMT. Rather, I provide these legal classifications to point out the range of legal codes that may be utilized by U.S. law enforcement to justify the forced-repatriation of individuals. Furthermore, such legal codes are often cited by law enforcement agencies and the Trump Administration as justification for the portrayal of immigrants and forced-returnees as criminals, despite the fact that there is “no evidence that immigrants commit more crimes than native-born American citizens” (Ye He Lee, 2015).

Theoretical Framework

Critical Language and Race Theory (LangCrit) lends itself to the examination of how gen1.5 adults do citizen identity through language. The concept of doing language describes the notion that language is a performative tool used by speakers to enact certain expressions of identity. From a LangCrit perspective, identity is fluid and complex rather than fixed. Through an analysis of the identity experiences of multilingual Japanese-Canadian children in Montréal, Alison Crump proposed LangCrit as a lens that identifies and challenges the complex interactions between “audible and visible identities” (Crump, 2014a) because “fixed identity categories do not recognize the acts of identity that individuals perform through language” (Crump, 2014b, p. 208). Crump challenges essentialized notions of belonging which equate language with membership in a one-to-one relationship. Critically, this framework challenges ideas of what it means to sound like and look like someone that “belongs”. LangCrit scholars examine “the ways in which race, racism and racialization intersect with issues of language, belonging, and identity” (p. 207-208); through this critical lens, it is possible to capture the full spectrum of identity possibilities and the expressions of belonging enacted and perceived by speakers.

Power manifests in many ways through policies related to immigration, education, and language. Power also lives in the beliefs that individuals, communities, and societies have about criteria for belonging. According to LangCrit, “power has come to be clustered around certain linguistic resources in certain spaces” (Crump, 2014b, p. 209). In other words, certain spaces and contexts often elicit specific linguistic practices. In these spaces, particular resources are made available in the language or languages associated with social access and power. LangCrit is interested in examining the power in linguistic resources and spaces in order to understand how individuals do language, the values they associate with language, and the identity possibilities that result from the interaction between power and language in space. Existing sociolinguistic scholarship posits that language may, in all its complexity, index identities (Bucholtz & Hall, 2009). In analyzing the interaction between conversational code-switching and social identity, Auer (2003) argued that bilingual speech indexes extralinguistic social categories, referring to categories that are not intrinsically about language. Examples of such extralinguistic social categories might be ethnicity, nationality and citizenship status. More simply, certain ways of speaking are associated with certain identities (or certain ideas of belonging). Sometimes this indexing is imposed onto a speaker and other times a speaker actively engages in particular language practices in order to enact a social identity or to perceive themselves as having a certain identity (Auer, 2003). In this way, language is performative and the identities permitted through language are contrived and dictated by larger social structures rooted in essentialized notions of belonging, related to what an individual sounds like and looks like. Through LangCrit, Crump offers a framework through which to engage these concepts of belonging, language, race, and identity.

As a social practice, language and language ideologies have been studied by many researchers as a function of social identity. Particularly over the past two decades, scholars in the social sciences have approached questions about language ideologies to explore topics such as social identity and bilingual identity (Auer, 2003; Song, 2010; Zentella, 1997), the racialization of language (Leeman, 2004), and power structures rooted in language ideologies (Kroskrity, 2004). The present study explores the use of language in digital narratives as a tool for performing citizen identity, an extralinguistic category, and the implications this has for deportation experiences.

LangCrit views language as a social practice that informs social norms, such as how individuals and groups engage with each other and society. Crump proposed that boundaries around languages have been socially contrived and constructed, produced and maintained (Crump, 2014b). Specifically, “power is clustered around certain linguistic resources in certain spaces” and explores how such language boundaries inform what individuals can and cannot do with language in daily life, as well as the values associated with language use and possible identities (Crump, 2014b, p. 209). Importantly, language boundaries are not language barriers, rather boundaries refer to the socially constructed ways of doing language. The difference being, language boundaries refer to the social norms that dictate what language use is acceptable, whereas language barriers describe the discrepancy in language proficiency between interlocutors (Crump, 2014b citing Hill, 1998). I will elaborate on this concept of language boundaries in my analysis of the digital stories presented. While a linguistic perspective shall not adopt essentialized notions of language and identity, the reality is that many speakers do. Crump reminded us that, “even though languages are social constructions, the ideology of languages as fixed entities still carries a powerful social force” (Crump, 2014b, p. 209), which explains why in the present study we see the ideology of English as a tag for U.S. American belonging and citizen identity, linking a fixed language entity (English) with a nation-state identity (U.S. American).

LangCrit shares much in common with Raciolinguistics, first popularized by Flores and Rosa (2015) and elaborated on by Alim, Rickford, and Ball in their 2016 publication titled Raciolinguistics: How language shapes our ideas about race. Raciolinguistics focuses on the socially cyclical relationship between race, racialization, and language: language is used to construct race (“languaging race”) and perceptions of race influence how language is used (“racing language”). This framework has been utilized particularly well to better understand how sociolinguistic variation is intertwined with social and political factors. In this way, language may be used to seek or demonstrate (racial) group membership (Alim, Rickford, & Ball, 2016).

Crump explored these questions as well through her research on the linguistic racialization of speakers and the issue of “whiteness as a norm associated with native English speakers” (2014b, p. 207). LangCrit asserts that different physical and social spaces interact with racialized discourses impacting how speakers use language and perform identities. Understanding this power dynamic between normative spaces and language practices, Crump proposed LangCrit as a necessary contribution to critical studies on language.

Both LangCrit and Raciolinguistics acknowledge that linguistic racialization contributes to identity formation and expression, and is perpetuated through power structures. Examples of such power structures are governing bodies, such as the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement which seeks to identify and enforce categories of belonging and not belonging. Another example is that of educational institutions, which have historically segregated individuals in the U.S. on the basis of race, language, gender, and religious affiliation. Although LangCrit is the theoretical framework for the present study, it should be clear that Raciolinguistics is also a suitable lens.

Review of Previous Research

In 2012, the Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends published a report titled “When labels don’t fit: Hispanics and their views of identity” claiming that nearly half (47%) of Hispanics in the U.S. do not identify as a “typical American[s]” (Taylor, Hugo Lopez, Martínez, & Velasco, 2012, p. 3). Importantly, the report also claimed the opposite, that 47% of Latinos do identify as “typical[ly] American.” Taken from data collected as part of the 2011 National Survey of Latinos, the report highlighted the range of identity labels used by Hispanics and Latinos in the U.S., as well as their language beliefs and practices. Using data from a telephone survey of 1,220 Latino adults across 50 states, the report found that 21% of Latinos in the U.S. identify themselves as “American” most often, while 51% use their family’s country of origin to describe themselves, and 24% prefer the term “Hispanic” or “Latino.” Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, generation status appeared to influence these identity label preferences in the U.S.; first-generation immigrants born outside the U.S. were less likely than U.S.-born Hispanics to identify as a “typical American.”

The report demonstrates the complexity of “American” identity as experienced by Hispanics and Latinos, as well as the role of language and generation status in identity. Our interpretation of these findings influences how we think about identity as experienced and articulated by Hispanics and Latinos in the U.S. While it may be true that many adults surveyed for the report did not identify as a “typical American,” many do self-identify in this way. Furthermore, the report does not explain what it means to be a “typical American.” From a LangCrit perspective, we cannot essentialize notions of belonging, there is not one look or one sound that qualifies “American” identity. Raciolinguistic identities do not preclude citizen identity, as suggested by the “either-or” model of the report, which offers “American” as a category separate from the categories “Latino” and “Hispanic.” However, Crump also acknowledged the power of such essential notions of identity: “we cannot ignore that fixed categories do exist, problematic as they are. . . they are powerful in shaping an individual’s possibilities for becoming” (2014b, p. 209).

Therefore, LangCrit insists that we identify and challenge such essentializing notions, especially because individuals adopt them as part of their sense of identity. With regards to generation status, the study does not indicate the age of arrival of foreign-born respondents and thus, creates an overgeneralized interpretation of the identifiers used and preferred by first-generation Latino and Hispanic adults in the U.S. From a linguistic standpoint, language acquisition and language attitudes are quite different for young learners than for adult learners. Additionally, the use of English and Spanish tends to differ depending on the generation status of the speaker. This reflects a difference not only in language acquisition across ages but also in language use and ideologies. However, this study does make clear the need to explore further what it means to be “American” for immigrants in the U.S., particularly for gen1.5 adults, and the role of language in “American” identity.

Language and Identity

Language is a social practice through which ideas and beliefs are communicated (Crump, 2014b; Fairclough, 1989). As language is socially and locally constructed, analysis of language use can reveal connections to larger social, political, and historical practices and beliefs about language (Crump, 2014b). Language ideologies can unveil, among other things, how individuals are relegated to either positions of power or subordination within a society. Paul Kroskrity defined language ideologies as “beliefs, or feelings, about languages as used in their social worlds” (Kroskrity, 2004, p. 498). Language and language ideologies have been studied as a function of social and bilingual identity (Zentella, 1997; Song, 2010), the racialization of language (Leeman, 2004), and of power structures (Kroskrity, 2004). Woolard and Schieffelin (1994) asserted that studies in language ideology should demonstrate “a commitment to address the relevance of power relations to the nature of cultural forms and ask how essential meanings about language are socially produced as effective and powerful” (p. 58), and as such should adopt critical ideological analysis with a focus on the political use of language as an instrument of power maintenance. In the narratives analyzed here, power often stems from English as a commodity, tool and resource that grants access to particular services or spaces, or the nationalistic language ideologies that assign language a symbolic feature of self, community, and citizenship (Menard-Warwick, 2013). Therefore, to gain insight into the interaction between language and citizen identity, we must explore the beliefs and feelings that speakers have about language as they relate to their lived experiences around migration and deportation.

Translanguaging

First introduced by Cen Williams in 1994, translanguaging is defined as “an act of bilingual performance, as well as a bilingual pedagogy of bilingual teaching and bilingual learning” (García & Leiva, 2014, p. 199). At its conception, it referred to a pedagogical approach by which students alternated languages in order to develop literacy and writing skills in more than one language. Now, the term has expanded to refer to more fluid language practices and linguistic resources used and acquired by bilingual speakers and writers. From a pedagogical perspective, translanguaging has been theorized and applied as a linguistic resource to foster bilingual students’ full linguistic repertoire, while resisting “the historical and cultural positionings of English monolingualism in the USA” (p. 199). From a social justice standpoint, translanguaging challenges monolingual ideologies for U.S. citizens, as well as a “‘Hispanophone’ ideology that blames U.S. Latinos for speaking ‘Spanglish’” (p. 200). Translanguaging practices of speakers offer insight into the identities associated with language, space, and belonging.

In the present study, translanguaging practices by authors of deportation narratives are analyzed to ascertain how gen1.5 adult forced-returnees perform citizen identity through language. To approach this analysis, I view translanguaging through a LangCrit framework, which recognizes translanguaging as “what languagers (people) are doing [with language]” and acknowledges that speakers negotiate language use in order to navigate the “socially constructed boundaries around languages” (Crump, 2014b, p. 210). The ways in which instances of translanguaging occur through digital narratives are different than in a live conversation between two or more people because the socially constructed boundaries around languages are different online than they are off-line. In digital narratives, translanguaging takes shape through the interaction between Spanish and English accompanied by images that convey meaning and experiences. Speakers negotiate language choice in all interactions with interlocutors. Similarly, through digital narrative, a speaker negotiates ways of belonging and citizen identity through language, revealing a facet of translanguaging and identity.

Discourse Analysis and Digital Stories

While research has analyzed YouTube and other digital platforms in relation to education and participatory culture, there is a serious dearth of related literature that has utilized YouTube in its analysis. Van Zoonen et al. (2010) analyzed YouTube reactions to Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam video Fitna. The aim of their study was to analyze if, and in what ways, the participatory culture of YouTube invited performances of citizenship. The study asked “what kind of selves people produce through uploading their videos” against or in support of Fitna(p. 253). According to the authors, citizenship is embedded in practices and routines and “by doing citizenship one becomes a citizen” (p. 252). A key feature of performing citizenship through a platform such as YouTube is the interaction between a video author and viewer or listener. For van Zoonon et al, the real or imagined audience informs how a speaker perceives their performance as meaningful.

The authors conducted a content analysis of various styles of YouTube videos in response to Fitna to assess if and how video posters assert their performance of citizenship and which audiences they assume. The authors found a range of citizenship performances assumed by the video authors. For example, many videos made in response to Fitna were explicit apologies for Wilders’ video. Speakers in these response videos performed political selves positioning the video authors as citizens with a need to apologize in the name of the Dutch nation state, feeling the Fitna video reflected poorly on their citizenship and nationality. Another type of citizenship performance was analyzed in testimonial style videos, in which video authors make a case for themselves as being different from the Muslims portrayed in Fitna. Testimonial videos, according to the authors, are perfect examples of the performance of an inclusive self that aims to be accepted by an audience. This study demonstrates how digital culture platforms, (such as the Humanizando la Deportación project, discussed in the present study), can foster spaces for performed citizen identity as articulated and performed by the video authors. Furthermore, YouTube videos are described as ‘border-circumventing’ which makes it easier for speakers to participate in citizenship as a performance and practice. These findings indicate the value in exploring language use as citizen performance on social platforms such as YouTube.

Data Collection

Language used to describe immigration and immigrants in the U.S. has led to hostile portrayals of immigrants. Most recently, the current president of the U.S., Donald Trump, has described immigrants as follows:

When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (Ye He Lee, 2015 citing Donald Trump, Presidential Announcement Speech, June 16, 2015)

Unfortunately, the example above is only one of many in which the president of the U.S. wrongfully makes a blanket statement that portrays immigrants as criminals. When asked about the comments he made on June 16th, Donald Trump said, “they are, in many cases, criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.” (July 6, 2015). In reality, the claims made by Donald Trump are not reflected empirically and instead perpetuate xenophobic perceptions of immigrants. In fact, first-generation immigrants have lower crime rates than native-born Americans (Camarota & Vaughan, 2009; Ye Hee Lee, 2015), and despite the lack of evidence for hostile claims like those made by Donald Trump, such rhetoric has perpetuated a racist view of Mexican and Central American immigrants in the U.S., clouding the realities of immigration and deportation.

In the current sociopolitical climate of immigration, activists and research scholars have trended more toward collaboration to create transparent and inclusive conversations about the impacts of deportation. One such collaboration, Humanizando la Deportación, is an online archive of personal digital stories of deportation. Digital storytelling is a narrative genre that pairs recorded audio with visuals (e.g. still images, drawings, clippings, or segments of other video clips) to create a single video or segment of a video (Hull & Nelson, 2005; Lambert, 2013). Digital stories range in length but are generally much shorter than a movie and are often uploaded to social platforms online, such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, or original website archives. This genre of narrative has enabled storytellers to share their voice with an audience of fellow internet users. In some instances, viewers and listeners can engage with the original storyteller through a social platform’s comment function, though this is not always the case.

For the present study, data is analyzed from five digital stories selected from the larger archive of the Humanizando la Deportación (HLD) project. I participated in this project as a field researcher and video production collaborator during the summer of 2017. The aim of the HLD project is to put a human face to the issue of deportation as experienced by individuals forcefully repatriated to Mexico from the U.S., and to challenge the perception of immigrants and migrants as ‘bad hombres,’ a narrative driven by the U.S. media and President Donald Trump. While deportation rates reached record highs under the Obama Administration (Nowrasteh, 2019), the policies and language used to describe immigrants under the Trump Administration have been uniquely divisive, discriminatory, and hostile. Furthermore, the Obama Administration started the DACA program (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) in an effort to create a path toward legal citizenship for gen1.5 individuals. The Trump Administration has proposed rescinding the DACA program and has put forth additional legislation to limit immigration into the U.S. The HLD project is a response to the social and political perceptions of immigrants and migration. Through this project, researchers collaborate with forced-returnees in various cities throughout Mexico to produce “cut-and-mix” digital testimonials (van Zoonen et al, 2010). Cut-and-mix videos are defined by van Zoonen et al. (2010, p. 254) as “Self produced video consisting of self made, or existing footage, pictures, images, words and sound, combined into a new ‘text’” (p. 254). A forced-returnee and one or more researchers collaborate to create these videos. The authors decide what images they want to be included in the video, such as family photos with or without identifying information or photos from image databases. The story told in each video is unique to the video author and elicited through open conversation with the researcher(s). My role, as one of the project researchers, was to collaborate with other researchers and the video author. I joined in an open conversation about the author’s experience with deportation and assisted in all aspects of the video production process4.

The videos examined here were published between 2017 and 2018 and were chosen for their focus on individuals that could be described as generation 1.5. I chose to focus on gen1.5 individuals because, sometimes, they are unaware that they do not have legal citizen status in the U.S. despite feeling like they belong after spending much, if not most of their lives in the U.S. My initial feelings about the importance of this project arose when I read reports of individuals being repatriated to Mexico who don’t speak Spanish, which highlights a linguistic component of migration and deportation. While my focus is on the relationship between language and citizen identity, I did not choose digital stories based on the language of the author. The videos include audio in Spanish, English, or a mixture of the two. I transcribed the videos at the most basic level and relied on ordinary punctuation. I did not transcribe prosody, body language, or false starts because physical features were often not included (see APPENDIX I for transcription conventions). Additionally, I did not feel that prosody would be a critical component of my analysis since I am mainly concerned with what is said, and not how it is said.

Data Analysis

In addressing the research questions, I coded for instances in which speakers talked about language and tagged topics associated with each mention. I also coded for instances in which speakers talked about ‘citizenship’, which I identified as instances in which the narrator talks about things related to ‘legal’ citizenship, such as documentation, being detained, and the deportation process. To understand the more subjective features of ‘citizen’ and the process of deportation I coded for ‘belonging’, instances in which speakers talk about being in affiliation with certain people, spaces or locations. This, I felt, was an intuitive category to include since forced-returnees experience physical relocation. All analyses are based on the original transcription, not the translation.

For the present analysis, I focus on one of the main themes that emerged from my initial coding: Language and belonging. I analyze the identity descriptors related to citizen identity and belonging, the use of English and Spanish, as well as instances of translanguaging. The analysis that follows highlights how authors of digital deportation narratives signal ideological positions around language and what it means to be a ‘citizen’. I then offer a separate section to discuss the use of translanguaging as a performative tool to convey belonging.

Language and Belonging

One way that gen1.5 forced-returnees convey ideas around what it means to be a citizen is through talking about language in relation to experiences with deportation. In the excerpts below, it becomes evident that the experience of deportation challenges individuals’ notions of their own citizen identity. For Danny, Jorge, and Alex, language figures squarely into feelings and thoughts about belonging. These speakers share the ways that language informs or qualifies what it means to be a citizen in the context of the U.S. and Mexico border.

Danny Juaregui Mariz

First they Americanize you and then they throw you out / Primero te Americanizan y luego te expulsan

Humanizando la Deportación (2017)

Danny Juaregui Mariz arrived in the U.S. at the age of 3 and was repatriated over 40 years later. Danny’s entire narrative is in English, and although he would sometimes speak in Spanish during our collaboration meetings, he preferred to speak in English. Danny built his life in the U.S. and believes that certain abilities and knowledge, like speaking English and knowing about American history, contribute to his sense of belonging in the U.S. As the title of his video states, Danny felt that he was made to be “Americanized” by the U.S. before being forced to repatriate to Mexico. In the first few sentences of his story, Danny says “I’ve been trying to survive over here by just trying to be an honest citizen same as I was over there” (lines 1-3), in which he refers to himself as one who was not only a citizen but an “honest citizen” in the U.S., which he calls “over there.”

1 First they Americanize you and then they throw you out. I got deported two and a half

2 years ago and I’ve been trying to survive over here by just trying to be an honest citizen

3 same as I was over there on the other side. And I’ve been surviving over here ever since

4 with the economy 60 dollars a week, just trying to make a living over here while I try to

5 make my way back. I was born in Guadalajara and at 2 years my father and my mother

6 came for me and they brought me to Tijuana and we crossed to the United States with

7 the visa. I was 3 years old when I crossed over. In east LA I grew up. Went to

8 elementary. My first language was English. It is English. I learned how to be an

9 American, American history, everything that has to do with America. I was there all my

10 life. I did a few mistakes hanging out with the wrong crowd all the time but I was never a

11 criminal. I never shot nobody. I never robbed nobody.

Danny identifies English as his first and dominant language, linking his citizen identity to his language use and knowledge of “how to be an American” (line 12). That Danny felt like a citizen because of his educational and linguistic experiences and was not a criminal challenges the rhetoric tossed around in U.S. media (such as the June 16th, 2015 speech by Donald Trump referenced above) that undocumented individuals are law-breaking, non-English speaking, dangerous, uneducated people. So, while Danny does identify being an American with being a valid and deserving citizen, his ideas about why he is American are reflective of larger societal ideas about what it means to be a U.S. citizen: English speaking, non-criminal, contributing member of society. These learned features of citizen identity are not simply things Danny knows to be true, but they are part of his way of doing citizenship through language and knowledge of being. From a LangCrit perspective, Danny’s experience echoes the notion that “the ideology of language as an entity is tightly intertwined with the doing of language” (Crump, 2014b, p. 210). The idea of language as an “entity” refers to the essentialized ideas of language as something a speaker has and that is linked to national identity.

In the lines below, Danny talks about belonging in the U.S. because his “family’s over there” (line 31) and emphasizes his feelings of belonging in the U.S. by countering with his feelings about not belonging in Tijuana (referred to by English speaking locals as TJ). He is asking the audience to hear his experience and see him as a citizen, as he qualifies his eligibility. He misses his family and feels out of place, forced to live in a different country and city, where many don’t manage to find “a way of life” (line 34).

30 I got thrown out because of the Bill Clinton law and the reason why I came back is

31 my family’s over there, my kids are over there. Because

32 I have no business over here in TJ, I have no business in Mexico.

33 All my friends that got deported, most of them have died or committed suicide because

34 they just can’t find a way of life over here.

35 Me, I’ve just been strong and I’ve been going forward.

To “have no business” implies a situation in which a person does not belong: in a place, doing or saying something. However, having no business does not mean the same thing as having no legal right. When Danny says he has “no business over here in TJ,” he isn’t talking about the legal documentation that he lacks. On the contrary, he does have legal status in Mexico, but he has no business being there, meaning no connection, no reason, and no sense of belonging. Danny speaks to the feeling of belonging as a citizen because of the forty-plus years of his life he had spent in the U.S. and his sense of being “Americanized.”

Jorge

Made a Criminal in America / Hecho un criminal en América

Humanizando la Deportación (2017)

In the following excerpt, we hear Jorge talk about feeling and believing that, in the absence of proficient Spanish, he must live in the U.S. where English dominates and offers a sense of belonging and familiarity. Jorge was 8 months old when he was brought to the U.S. and was repatriated to Mexico at the age of 23. Like many undocumented individuals in the U.S., Jorge was unaware of his documentation status before he turned 19 when he was deported for the first time. In the excerpt below, Jorge shares about his first experience arriving as a forced-returnee in Mexico and the linguistic circumstances that brought him to return to the U.S. despite his undocumented status. Jorge’s entire narrative is in English.

48 I actually tried to enroll in the military but I wasn’t able to because I was deported right

49 before my last meeting or my last appointment with the recruitment officer.

50 I was deported at age 19. I was sent to Mexico. I did not know where I was, what I was

51 doing. I did not really speak Spanish. I spoke really really terrible Spanish and it was

52 mainly slang words that I had picked up in California. So I had no choice but to return

53 back to the United States. I returned five days later.

Jorge felt that because his Spanish was “really really terrible” he could not remain in Mexico. Not knowing the language well prevented him from knowing where he was and what he was doing. He felt lost, in Spanish. So, for Jorge, a sense of belonging is linked to language ability. Belonging also signals a sense of citizenship, because without the ability to speak the local language, Jorge did not feel that he could fully participate in daily life and community. Upon his re-entry into the U.S. Jorge returned to Alabama where he had previously lived, the place he considered home.

Alex Murillo

American Soldiers in Exile / Soldados Americanos en Exilio

Humanizando la Deportación (2017)

Alex, a U.S. Navy veteran, was deported after spending nearly all of his life in the U.S., the country he, like Jorge, identifies as home. Alex identifies as being American in multiple ways, as evidenced by the way he talks about himself and his experiences. In the excerpt below Alex introduces himself as American and talks about feeling exiled from his home.

1 My name is Alex Murillo. I’m a U.S. Navy veteran. I’m from Phoenix, Arizona.

2 I’ve been deported now almost 5 years. I work with Unified U.S. Veterans.

3 We are trying to get back home. I have all my family, my kids – everybody’s in the U.S.

4 I’ve been in the U.S. my whole life.

5 I was taken to the U.S. maybe when I was 1 year old. Started my whole life there.

6 All of my thoughts and memories are that of an American kid.

7 I identify with being an American.

8 It’s not something you can take away from me just by deporting me.

Alex’s video begins with a picture of him in his Navy attire. The image scrolls out and down to give the audience a full view of Alex in his uniform. The next image depicts Alex with fellow veterans before switching to a picture of Alex with his family. These images invite the viewer to first see Alex as a U.S. veteran, which offers a particularly American imagery. In lines 5-8 Alex explicitly says that his “memories are that of an American kid” and feels that “being an American it’s not something you can take away” (line 8). Alex was raised in Phoenix, Arizona and spent his entire life in the U.S., where he attended school before joining the U.S. Navy. For Alex, being a citizen comes with thoughts, memories, and experiences of the world. Alex’s narrative is exclusively in English, a language choice that reflects his citizen identity. Choosing to say, in English, that he identifies as a member of an English dominant speaking country serves to legitimize his citizen identity and his view that language, a medium for thoughts, informs what it means to be a U.S. citizen. Regardless of the physical relocation forced upon him, Alex’s identification as American remains.

Translanguaging

Video authors Zaret and Jesús translanguage throughout their narrative. Using both Spanish and English, paired with visual cues intentionally timed to accompany particular excerpts of their narratives, translanguaging conveys meaning and experiences to the audience. For both Zaret and Jesús language has played key roles in their citizen identity in the U.S. and Mexico, and they address the weight of their linguistic choices.

Zaret

Ni de aquí ni de allá / Not from here, nor from there

Humanizando la Deportación (2018)

Throughout her narrative Zaret switches between Spanish and English, spending a total of 3 minutes speaking in Spanish and about 2 minutes speaking in English. Zaret was not actually deported, though she was forced to repatriate to Mexico when her parents decided to return due to their increased experience with violence against Chicana/o and Latina/o individuals in the U.S. Zaret has much to say about the role of language in her experiences with migration. Zaret’s video opens with a picture of herself as a young girl holding up a stuffed animal, flanked on either side by family members. The excerpt below begins at minute 1:47 and is accompanied by an image depicting the U.S. and Mexico flags blending together (line 21) before transitioning to separate stock images or signs that say “Aqui se habla Español”, immediately followed by a sign in all red letters that reads “English spoken here” (lines 22-23). The image that follows (lines 23-24) depicts a red colored ‘Uncle Sam’ pointing to the viewer with words that read “I want you to speak English” in blue and red letters. All three signs are written exclusively in capital letters, perhaps emphasizing their purpose as warning signs or demands. In this excerpt, Zaret speaks candidly about her experiences transitioning between life in Mexico and the U.S. as a young immigrant. For Zaret, learning English while living in the U.S. was necessary not to be looked at as “weird” (line 23), as an outsider. Around the age of seven, Zaret was removed from school in Mexico and migrated to the U.S. with her parents. As the title of her narrative suggests, Zaret’s experience with migration and deportation made her feel as though she was “ni de aquí ni de allá” (Not from here, nor from there – see APPENDIX II for translation of Zaret’s narrative excerpts).

21 Y siento que lo más fuerte de la transition from Mexico to the states was the language.

22 You walk in Mexico and you speak English, they look at you weird. If you walk in the

23 States and you speak Spanish they look at you weird. So I had to learn English. One way

24 or the other I had to learn so I could communicate in school, outside, friends. If I needed

25 to buy something, if I needed to use the bathroom, if I needed just whatever, I needed to

26 have English, mainly. Spanish was my first language so I did have that one, but obviously

27 when I went to school I was not learning Spanish anymore. So my Spanish start fucking

28 up. It was bad, there were some words that I forgot how to pronounce. I didn’t know how

29 to read well in Spanish. And I think my mom was really smart when she said, “en la casa

30 no hablen en inglés. En la casa yo quiero que sigan hablando en español porque si en

31 dado caso que llegamos a ir a México ustedes tienen que tener el español.”

36 But you can’t be safe. You don’t feel safe. You don’t feel comfortable being in a place

37 where any day you could be arrested and sent to the country where you’re from. So even

38 though my parents had bought a car and we were good in money, there was a lot of

39 inseguridad in the house. Creo que muchos de lo que hemos pasado por situaciones así lo

40 podemos compartir y es algo muy desagradable. El hecho de que tengamos esa

41 inseguridad de ese miedo de que algo va a pasar, y no algo bueno. Si no algo – algo que

42 puede destruir tu familia. Y el hecho de que obviamente también hay bullying en la

43 escuela de que “mira no habla inglés, mira su inglés como es” # muchas cosas que

44 te pueden afectar, no tan solo a los niños si no cualquier persona.

For Zaret, acquiring and using Spanish and English are linked to a desire to avoid being looked at as “weird.” Zaret’s narrative addresses a range of experiences around language that relate to meeting basic needs in the U.S., for example when she says, “If I needed to buy something, if I needed to use the bathroom, if I needed just whatever, I needed to have English, mainly” (lines 24-25). Zaret also talks about the way she has been treated by others in both the U.S. and Mexico in response to her language choices, reflecting that “You walk in Mexico and you speak English, they look at you weird. If you walk in the States and you speak Spanish they look at you weird. So I had to learn English” (lines 22-23). These experiences coalesce to inform particular language ideologies rooted in lived realities: the ‘right’ sound is required to access basic needs and acceptance from local speakers. The power in language, specifically in speaking the ‘right’ language for acceptance, and decent human treatment, is demonstrative as well in Zaret’s reflection on the bullying she experienced as a result of her language. Despite her efforts to be accepted in the U.S. through her use of English, the monolingual ideology present in the majority of U.S. schools compromised her feelings of belonging as well as her sense of safety. While a student in U.S. schools she experienced linguistic discrimination, which Zaret refers to as bullying (lines 42-44) and was forced to prioritize English (lines 26-28). Meanwhile, her mother emphasized the importance of maintaining Spanish in case they ever needed to return to Mexico, where Spanish is the dominant language and is held up by similar monolingual ideologies that index English speakers as “weird” and U.S.-learned Spanish as incorrect or undesirable. For Zaret, the linguistic experiences she describes contribute to her personal ideologies about who she can or should be and where she is permitted to belong as a result of her language use. Her experiences echo the implications of language boundaries, discussed by Crump (2014b), which dictate how speakers such as Zaret are permitted to do language. Zaret, like many immigrants in the U.S., tried to belong in the U.S. and avoid being looked at as “weird” through her use of English. The connection between language, identity, and belonging followed Zaret across the border once repatriated to Mexico.

Jesús

Mi sueño no termina ahí / My dream doesn’t end there

Humanizando la Deportación (2017)

In the following narrative, Jesús addresses issues of citizen identity and paid taxes. I worked with Jesús in the production of his video. The majority of Jesús’s narrative is in Spanish, though he does code-switch in a few instances. In our meetings, we mostly spoke in English, though much time was spent translanguaging between English and Spanish when discussing his narrative and video production. Jesús explicitly requested not to be identified in his narrative, so his face is never shown and he does not provide his last name. He made this decision to protect his family that remains in the U.S. and to practice agency in starting his new life in Tijuana. As a bilingual forced-returnee, Jesús found work in a restaurant in a touristy neighborhood in Tijuana, where he often uses his English skills. After living as a legal resident in the U.S. for most of his life, Jesús shares his concerns about the fate of his paid taxes. He explains the removal of certain civic rights as a demonstration of revoked citizen identity.

43 And another thing I was wondering about, what’s gonna happen with my taxes?

44 I know they’re not for me, so they say, but it doesn’t matter because I don’t want them

45 for me. My kids are American citizens. They’re gonna need the help now that they’re

46 going to start going to college, universities. Where does that money go? Who keeps it?

47 That’s a big question. Personally, I think I lost my rights or I lost all my benefits.

48 But, what about my kids? They’re still U.S. citizens, they deserve that, they deserve

49 to get that money to help them get to college and university.

While the loss of tax benefits creates financial burdens for an individual or family, the symbolism behind the action is disruptive as well because it sends the message that Jesús is no longer welcome to fully participate in society and that his contributions will not benefit his family. In positioning himself in comparison to his children, who are “still U.S. citizens” and “they deserve that, they deserve to get that money to help them get to college and university” (lines 48-49), Jesús suggests that he no longer identifies as a citizen because he was stripped of his benefits. Through this excerpt, we learn much about Jesús’s ideas of what it means to be a citizen. For him, it means not losing civic rights, such as full participation in, and contribution to, the economy. Being a citizen also means speaking English and sounding like an American. To gain legitimacy from viewers and listeners Jesús decided to break from Spanish for this portion of the video in order to be understood fully by his English-speaking audience, who he talked about being American viewers and individuals such as himself, who had identified as American and participated as such. By posing questions in English about his paid taxes in the U.S. Jesús indexes his identity as an English-speaking, tax-paying American citizen, who has been stripped of his rights.

Discussion

The narratives analyzed in the present study reveal particular facets of what it means to be a citizen for gen1.5 forced-returnees. The authors of the digital stories discussed in the previous pages talked about language as a quality that labels one as belonging in a place. For some, English is viewed as a requisite of American identity. Spanish is talked about as a skill that some gen1.5 individuals lack, a deficiency that prevents one from acclimating or belonging in Mexico, as a survival tool in the event of repatriation to Mexico, or as a link to heritage and family. Many gen1.5 adults who have repatriated to Mexico view themselves as Americans. This reality impacts their integration into Mexico, their employment and social life, as well as acclimating to Spanish use. If we listen to the stories shared by Danny, Jésus, Zaret, Jorge, and Alex through the lens of LangCrit, we hear the ideology of languages as “fixed entities” associated with citizen identity (Crump, 2014b, p. 209). From a LangCrit perspective, we step back to acknowledge the role of power structures and social norms (e.g., Donald Trump’s description of immigrants, K-12 English only language policies) on expressions of identity and language ideologies. The videos produced and archived in the HLD project are also uploaded to the project’s YouTube page. Within YouTube, there are power dynamics at work that involve language. The social practice of language informs the interactive component of performing citizenship, resulting in the categorization of who is and is not a citizen. As video collaborators and uploaders of the HLD series, we were aware of the possibility that other YouTube users could, if given the outlet, leave hostile comments and undermine the narrative author’s sense of belonging and citizenship. For this reason, the HLD research team decided to deactivate the comment feature on YouTube.

There are additional limitations to the present study due to the nature of digital data collection. Research that aims to examine digital narratives must come to terms with limitations, such as not knowing the full context of the narrative itself. Additionally, the production process can influence the content of a narrative (Riessman, 2003) and such information is not available to the analyst. The “behind the scenes” language use between the video author and collaborators is not available, we only see a part of the complex role that language plays in the experience and performance of citizen identity. Additionally, the languages used by a collaborator may influence the language use of the narrator. Finally, we can only speculate as to the intended audience that the narrator had in mind when they shared their deportation narrative.

Digital narratives foster a platform through which individuals can express citizen identity through the author-audience interaction. Given that the narratives in the present corpus are archived on YouTube, there is arguably a presumed understanding of the global status of the audience. For van Zoonen et al. (2010) the notion of citizenship can be thought of as connectivity because citizenship as a performance requires interaction between the individual performing citizenship and a viewer or listener that validates the performance. Accordingly, “Their videos thus perform a kind of citizenship, an outreach to strangers as it were, that is based on the desire to present a true picture of oneself to others, and to solve misunderstandings” (van Zoonen et al., 2010, p. 259). The digital narratives of deportation discussed and analyzed in the present study can be described as van Zoonen et al. (2010) would propose above, as a sort of ‘outreach to strangers’, a gesture of testimony that asks the listeners and viewers to understand their story, and to view citizenship through the same lens. Furthermore, citizenship is embedded in the performance itself: “by doing citizenship one becomes a citizen” (p. 252). While the content of the digital narratives discussed here covers a range of themes, what the videos have in common is an assumption about the audience: there is an audience that chooses to hear the speaker’s story. Further analysis of the audience’s role in the language use of deportation narratives needs to be explored.

A gen1.5 narrator’s choice to speak in English throughout their story of deportation emphasizes their status as someone who knows the dominant language of the U.S., as well as knowledge of American culture, including English as the language most associated with school and education in the U.S. The majority of states in the U.S. only offer monolingual English education, a fact that should not be forgotten when considering why children are ‘raised’ speaking English over other languages in the U.S., and likely fosters and reinforces ideologies that place English as a trait that makes one a citizen, as addressed in Zaret’s narrative. Citizen identity as indexed by language could be thought of as a tag that marks a particular social identity (Ochs, 1996). Speakers are actively constructing themselves through language as members in particular social, political, and geographical spaces. Such a tag could be language choice, such as speaking in English, Spanish, or code-switching. How speakers identify themselves matters when structures such as educational institutions and government agencies exist to inform and perpetuate such tags. For many gen1.5 adults like Danny, the experience of citizen identity acquired in the U.S. results in feeling that “first they Americanize you and then they throw you out” (2017). For many gen1.5 adults, doing citizen identity through language is learned and expected in the U.S., and follows them to the other side of the border. The stories discussed in the present study reveal that both language ideologies and practices interact with the mere possibilities of citizen identity formation and maintenance.

Conclusion

The present study offers an initial analysis of the role of language in what it means to be a citizen for generation 1.5 adults forced to repatriate to Mexico by the United States. In order to more thoroughly approach the topics discussed here, future studies should offer macro-level critical discourse analysis, such as content analysis of discourses produced in American and Mexican media, to examine the features of language ideologies that inform understandings of the role of language in citizen identity. The study urges social scientists and activists to be attentive to the ways that language contributes to what it means to belong in certain contexts and spaces, particularly for generation 1.5 adults. Such understanding is necessary to best support the social and linguistic identities, as well as the linguistic needs of generation 1.5 adults after deportation.

Due to the realities experienced by forced-returnees that make physical access to interviews and other methods of data collection difficult, in addition to the social justice movement currently thriving on the web, researchers and social activists should continue to explore language use in digital narratives. Identity, belonging, and language interact with experiences of migration and repatriation for generation 1.5 individuals in unique ways. What can linguists do to disrupt the hostile language ideologies that result in bullying or housing fraud, such as Zaret experienced? The impact of deportation crosses generations, languages, and man-made borders. There are voices to be heard.

Acknowledgements

In addition to Professor Robert Irwin, I would like to thank my fellow researchers and members of the Humanizando la Deportación research team that I worked with in the video collaborations mentioned: Guillermo Alonso Meneses, Danae Valenzuela, Sarah Hart, Lizbeth de la Cruz Santana, Ana Luisa Calvillo, John Guzman, Yesika Ordaz, Yaira Maren, Marlene Mercado, José Israel Ibarra, and Dörte Krebsbach.

References

8 USC 1227: Deportable aliens. In Title 8-ALIENS AND NATIONALITY, Chapter 12 -Immigration and Nationality, Subchapter II, Part IV – Inspection, Apprehension, Examination, Exclusion, and Removal). Retrieved from https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title8-section1227&num=0&edition=prelim

Alim, H. S., Rickford, J. R., & Ball, A. F. (Eds.). (2016). Raciolinguistics: How language shapes our ideas about race. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Auer, P. (2003). A postscript: Code-switching and social identity. Journal of Pragmatics, 37(3),403-410.

Bucholtz, M. & Hall, K. (2009). Locating Identity in Language. In Llamas, C., & Watt, D.(Eds.). (2009). Language and Identities, (18-28). Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com

Bray, Ilona. (n.d.). Crimes that will make an Immigrant deportable: How crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and other crimes can make even a green card holder deportable from the U.S.. Nolo. Retrieved from https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/crimes-that-will-make-immigrant-deportable.html

Burgen, S. (2015). US now has more Spanish speakers than Spain – only Mexico has more. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/29/us-second-biggest-spanish-speaking-country

Camarota, S.A., & Vaghan, J.M. (2009, November 18). Immigration and Crime: Assessing a conflicted Issue. Center for Immigration Studies. Retrieved from https://cis.org/Report/Immigration-and-Crime

Crump, A. (2014a). “But your face, it looks like you’re English”: LangCrit and the experiences of multilingual Japanese-Canadian children in Montréal. (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation). McGill University.

Crump, A. (2014b). Introducing LangCrit: Critical Language and Race Theory, Critical Inquiry in Language Studies, 11:3, 207-224, DOI: 10.1080/15427587.2014.936243

Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and Power. Language in Social Life Series. Longman Inc., New York: NY.

Flores, N., & Rosa, J. (2015). Undoing appropriateness: Raciolinguistic ideologies and language diversity in education. Harvard Educational Review, 85(20), 149-171.

García, O., & Leiva, C. (2014). Theorizing and Enacting Translanguaging for Social Justice. In A. Blackledge & A. Creese (eds.), Heteroglossia as Practice and Pedagogy. Dordrecht: Springer.

Hill, J.H. (1998). Language, race, and white public space. American anthropologist, 100(3), 680-689.

Hull, G. A., & Nelson, M. E. (2005). Locating the semiotic power of multimodality. Written Communication, 22(2), 224-261.

Jauregui Mariz, Danny (2017). “First they Americanize you and then they throw you out.” Humanizando la Deportación, #6: http://humanizandoladeportacion.ucdavis.edu/en/2017/07/19/first-they-americanize-you-then-they-throw-you-out/

Jésus (2017). “My Dream Doesn’t End There.” Humanizando la Deportación, #31, http://humanizandoladeportacion.ucdavis.edu/en/2017/08/15/my-dream-doesnt-end-there/

Jorge (2017). “Made a criminal in America.” Humanizando la Deportación, #22: http://humanizandoladeportacion.ucdavis.edu/en/2017/08/05/hecho-un-criminal-en-america/

Kroskrity, P.V. (2004). Language ideologies. In A. Duranti (Eds.), A companion to linguistic anthropology, (pp. 496-517). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Lakhani, N., & Jacobo, M. (2016). Uprooted in Mexico: The US children ‘returned’ to a country they barely know. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/13/immigration-us-children-migrants-returned-to-mexico

Lambert, J. (2013). Digital storytelling: Capturing lives, creating community. Routledge.

Leeman, J. (2004). Racializing language: A history of linguistic ideologies in the US Census. Journal of Language and Politics, 3(3), 507-534.

Menard-Warwick, J. (2013). The world doesn’t end at the corner of their street: Language ideologies of Chilean English teachers. In V. Ramanathan (Ed.), Language policies and (dis)citizenship: Rights, access, pedagogies (pp. 73-91). Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters.

Migration Policy Institute (2015), The Mexican diaspora in the United States. RAD Diaspora Profile.

Migration Policy Institute (2016). Age−sex pyramids of U.S. immigrants and native-born populations, 1970−present. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/age-sex-pyramids-immigrant-and-native-born-population-over-time

Murillo, A (2017). “American Soldiers in Exile.” Humanizando la Deportación, #30a, http://humanizandoladeportacion.ucdavis.edu/

Nowrasteh, A. (2019, September 16). Deportation rates in historical perspective. CATO at liberty. CATO Institute. Retrieved from https://www.cato.org/blog/deportation-rates-historical-perspective

Ochs, E., & Capps, L. (1996). Narrating the self. Annual Review of Anthropology, 25(1), 19-43.

Riessman, C. (2003). Analysis of personal narratives. In J. Holstein & J Gubrium (Eds), Inside interviewing: New lenses, new concerns (pp. 331-346). London: Sage Publications.

Song, J. (2010). Language ideology and identity in transnational space: globalization, migration, and bilingualism among Korean families in the USA. International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 13(1), 23-42.

Spanish Language Domains (2014, July 26). “The Numbers of Spanish Speakers in the World Exceeds 500 Million”. Retrieved from http://spanishlanguagedomains.com/the-numbers-of-spanish-speakers-in-the-world-exceeds-500-million/

Taylor, P., Hugo Lopez, M., Martínez, J., Velasco, G. (2012, April 4). “When labels don’t fit: Hispanics and their views of identity – The American Experience”. Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2012/04/04/iii-the-american-experience/

Unidad de Política Migratoria. (2017). “Boletín mensual de estadísticas migratorias: Mujeres y hombres”. Secretaría de Gobernación, Estados Unidos Mexicanos.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2018, October 19). Profiles on Lawful Permanent Residents [Data archive]. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/profiles-lawful-permanent-residents-fiscal-year-2017

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Number of illegal migrants intercepted during the ‘000 by Yuma Border Patrol sector. The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21579828-spending-billions-more-fences-and-drones-will-do-more-harm-good-secure-enough

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2013”. As cited by Pew Research Center, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/

van Dijk, T.A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse and Society, 4(2), 249-283.

van Zoonen, L., Vis, F., & Mihelj, S. (2010) Performing citizenship on YouTube: Activism, satire and online debate around the anti-Islam video Fitna. Critical Discourse Studies, 7:4, 249-262.

Watson-Gegeo, K. (1975). Transferable communicative routines: Strategies and group identity in two speech events. Language in Society, 4(1), pp. 53-72.

Woolard, K.A., & Schieffelin, B.B. (1994). Language ideology. Annual Reviews Anthropology, 23, pp. 55-82.

Ye Hee Lee, M. (July 8, 2015). “Donald Trump’s false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime”. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime

Zaret (2018). “Ní de aquí ni de allá.” Humanizando la Deportación, #60.http://humanizandoladeportacion.ucdavis.edu/

Zentella, A. (1997). Growing up bilingual: Puerto Rican children in New York. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

APPENDIX I: Transcription conventions

[…] indicates omitted excerpt or utterance

# incomprehensible utterance

italics denotes a translation

APPENDIX II: Translation of Zaret’s excerpt

21 And I feel like the hardest transition from Mexico to the states was the language

29 And I think my mom was really smart when she said, “at home

30 don’t speak English. At home I want you to continue to speak Spanish because if for

31 some reason we go back to Mexico you need to have Spanish”

39 insecurity in the house. I believe a lot of what we experienced and what

40 we can share is something really unpleasant. The fact that we have that

41 insecurity and that fear that something is going to happen, and not something good. If

42 anything something – something that can destroy your family. The fact that obviously

43 there’s also bullying in school like “look she can’t speak English, listen to her English”

a lot of things that

44 can affect you, and not just kids but any person.


[i] These statistics, while reported by the MPI, use calculations from Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), “Encuesta sobre migración en la frontera norte de México (EMIF Norte)” accessed by MPI September 2, 2016 www.colef.mx/emif/eng/bases.php; SEGOB “Boletines Estadísticos”, 2005, 2010, and 2015.

css.php